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DISAPPOINTING DIOGENES: 
THE LLC DEBATE THAT NEVER WAS 
ALLAN W. VESTAL* & THOMAS E. RUTLEDGE** 
INTRODUCTION 
Like Diogenes wandering the streets of Athens, lantern in hand, searching for 
the honest man, anyone seeking evidence of a debate among lawmakers over 
the wisdom of limited liability or the cost-shifting consequences of LLCs and 
LLPs is destined for disappointment.1 
[T]he collective wisdom over time of fifty-one legislatures and bar drafting 
committees must be far greater than that of one uniform or model law drafting 
organization. . . . As Hayek has said, “if left free, men will often achieve more 
than individual human reason could design or foresee.”2 
Professors Hillman and Ribstein provide us two polar views of the 
legislative process leading to creation of the still relatively new limited liability 
company and limited liability partnership forms.  Were state legislators in this 
process Hillman’s negligent actors, completely unmindful of the policy choices 
and tradeoffs inherent in their acts?  Or were they Ribstein’s deliberative 
yeoman legislators, crafting with care and creativity the legislative products of 
human enlightenment? 
We look at the history, for the first time, of the legislative deliberations on 
each jurisdiction’s laws enabling the formation of the limited liability company 
(LLC) and, to a lesser extent, the limited liability partnership (LLP).  Or, to be 
more accurate, we look at the sparse record of those deliberations; a sparseness 
of both the records kept and, more disturbing, a sparseness in the deliberations 
held. 
 
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law (Lexington, Kentucky).  I 
would like to thank Clay Wortham for his skillful research assistance. 
** Member, Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC (Louisville, Kentucky); Adjunct Professor of Law, 
University of Kentucky College of Law (Lexington, Kentucky). 
 1. Robert W. Hillman, New Forms and New Balances: Organizing the External Relations 
of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 613, 613 (1997). 
 2. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited 
Liability Companies, 66 U. COL. L. REV. 947, 951–52 (1995). 
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The creation of the limited liability company and limited liability 
partnership forms was one of the most sweeping changes in business 
organization law in our history.3  Combining limited liability and the ability to 
participate in management while enjoying flow-through taxation, the LLC and 
LLP forms allowed participants to have an essentially unprecedented mix of 
desirable attributes.4  This important change is even more notable because of 
the speed with which it was accomplished and the comprehensive nature of the 
adoptions—in eight years we went from having the LLC form moribund, 
having been adopted in only two fairly insignificant states and not having 
received the imprimatur of the IRS, to having the LLC form adopted in every 
state of the Union and being accepted by the IRS.5 
 
 3. See generally Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic 
Comparative Primer (Pt. 1), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited 
Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375 (1992) (discussing the 
LLC as an emerging entity); Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 
51 BUS. LAW. 1 (1995) (discussing the rapid growth and acceptance of LLCs); Thomas E. 
Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentucky’s New 
Organizational Option, 83 KY. L.J. 1 at 6–9 (1995). 
 4. While the corporate form with a so-called “S-election” provides for nearly equivalent tax 
treatment, management, and liability attributes, the availability of the form is limited.  For 
example, originally an S-corporation was limited to ten shareholders.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1) 
(1958) (amended 1976).  The threshold increased to fifteen with conditions in 1976 and fifteen 
generally in 1978.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1371(e)(1) (1976); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 
§ 341, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).  In 1981 the limit was raised to twenty-five, and in 1982 to thirty-
five.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (1982); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 
97-34, § 233, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).  In 1996 that limit was increased to seventy-five by the Small 
Business Job Protection Act of 1996.  Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1301, 110 Stat. 1777 (1996).  The 
limit was raised again to one hundred and the method of counting the number of shareholders was 
radically liberalized by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.  Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 231–
232, 118 Stat. 1433 (2004).  The Small Business Job Protection Act also provided for the Electing 
Small Business Trust and charitable organizations as permissible shareholders of an S-
corporation.  Pub. L. No. 104-188, §§ 1302(a), 1316(a), 110 Stat. 1785 (1996).  Other limitations 
on S-corporation status include the restriction to a single class of stock, a prohibition of non-
resident alien shareholders, and limits on trusts and estates as shareholders.  Recently, certain 
commentators have questioned the perhaps unreasoned expansion in the availability of limited 
liability.  See, e.g., J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited 
Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951 (2001); 
Allan W. Vestal, “Real Partnerships” and Real Problems: Conforming Business Entity Law to 
Fiscal Realities and Popular Conceptions, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877 (2003).  However, the issue is 
in no manner of recent vintage.  See, e.g., I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE 
CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 14 (Baker, Voorhis & Company 
eds., T. Morey & Son 1929) (1927) (“Whether the legislators have not been unduly liberal in 
[granting limited liability], particularly in the case of one-man companies where dummies are 
used for incorporating purposes, is a very grave problem, far beyond the scope of this paper.”). 
 5. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  This article will focus on the rise of 
LLCs, and put the rise of the LLP form to one side.  This is done because the record is more 
clearly seen on the LLC side—where the form was created from whole cloth and not against the 
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Such a sea-change in the law of business ventures should have been widely 
and carefully debated.  The policy implications of the marriage of limited 
liability, unlimited management participation, and favorable tax treatment 
should have been examined.  The fiscal implications of creating new business 
forms that would, under the preexisting rules, be exempt from taxation at the 
entity level should have been estimated with care and an analysis undertaken 
as to whether the tax treatment should have been linked to a corresponding 
benefit.6  At issue were matters of elemental fairness, such as leaving potential 
tort claimants with no practical recovery, horizontal equity (equivalent taxation 
of ventures irrespective of organizational structure), and revenue stability, such 
as removing from the states significant sources of tax collections.  These were 
not insignificant questions. 
Professor Hillman had it right; the legislative debate over the broader 
implications of the LLC and LLP forms never took place.  A close review of 
the legislative record reveals that in state after state the serious policy and 
fiscal implications of these new forms were not even addressed, much less 
seriously discussed.  In state after state the advocates of the new forms made 
arguments which, to put it charitably, are at best irrelevant and at worst simply 
untrue.  It was, as commentator Bill Callison has described it, a stampede.7 
I.  THE RISE OF THE LLC IN A KINTNER CLASSIFICATION WORLD 
The LLC (and just as equally the LLP) is a construct; a need was identified 
and something was devised to satisfy that need.  Now, to the extent that its aim 
is the ordering of society, all law is a construct.  But the LLC is a particularly 
acute example of the linkage between the objective and the means.  The 
objective: a business structure that would be taxed as a partnership under 
subchapter K and that would provide its owners limited liability unconditioned 
on the degree of involvement in management.  The means: the drafting and 
adoption of LLC legislation in the states and IRS confirmation of the tax 
treatment of the entities so created. 
 
background of a pre-existing form which was being changed.  There is no reason to believe, 
however, that the history of the legislative treatment of the LLP form would be different except in 
detail from that of the LLC form. 
 6. This question necessarily presupposes that entity level taxation is an appropriate “rent 
seeking” in return for organizational flexibility and limited liability.  Reasonable arguments may 
and have been made on either side of the position, and the authors in fact disagree on the 
“correct” answer.  See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge & Allan W. Vestal, Making the Obvious Choice 
Malpractice: LLPs and the Lawyer Liability Time Bomb in Kentucky’s 2005 Tax Modernization, 
94 KY. L. J. 17, 33–34 (2005); GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. L. INSTIT., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX PROJECT—TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 54 (1999). 
 7. See Callison, supra note 4, at 960. 
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The first LLC statute was considered, and in turn rejected, by the Alaska 
Legislature in 1975.8  Two years later, Wyoming adopted the first LLC 
statute.9  The development of the LLC was shortly thereafter dealt a near-death 
blow when the Service, in 1980, announced proposed amendments to the 
Kintner regulations10 that would have classified as a corporation any entity in 
which no member would be personally liable for debts of the organization.11  
These proposed regulations were published only one day before the release of 
a private letter ruling stating that a particular Wyoming LLC would be 
classified as a partnership.12  Florida passed the second LLC statute in 1982.13  
 
 8. S.B. 354, 9th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 1975). The primary reason for support of the 
Alaska LLC bill was to generate filing fees from LLCs organized in Alaska with the desire that 
Alaska become the “Delaware of limited liability companies.”  Limited Liability Company Act: 
Hearings on S.B. 354 Before Alaska Senate Judiciary Committee, 9th Leg., 2d Sess., at 2 (Feb. 3, 
1976) (statement of Mr. Schlosberg, Director of Banking, Securities, and Corporations). 
 9. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537–549 (effective 
Mar. 4, 1977) (current version at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101–17-15-144 (1999)).  The 
proponents of the Wyoming LLC bill were those who had been unsuccessful in Alaska.  See Geu, 
supra note 3, at 48. 
 10. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2 (1996) (repealed Jan. 1, 1997).  The Kintner classification 
regulations grew out of the decision rendered in United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 
1954), and were an effort by the Service to provide greater rigidity to the classification test set 
forth in Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), with the objective of making it more difficult 
for unincorporated business organizations to be classified as corporations.  Id.  This weighing of 
the test against corporate classification (and therefore in favor of partnership classification) was 
done by restricting the characteristics upon which classification would be determined to four 
(limited liability, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and centralized management), 
one of which, limited liability, exists only as a sovereign grant and not by private ordering, and by 
providing that a majority of the equally weighted factors was required for corporate classification.  
See Larson v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 159, 187 (1976) (Dawson, J., concurring); see also I.R.S. Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 7951006 (Aug. 21, 1979) (“It is not possible to obtain limited liability by agreement 
among the parties; it must be bestowed on the organization by the State.”); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 90 (1991) (“Of all the 
principal ‘corporate’ features, only limited liability is not explicitly made available by agreement 
to partnerships.”).  In the event of a tie—the presence of two factors and the absence of two 
factors—the entity would be classified as a partnership.  Id. 
 11. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 75709 (Nov. 17, 1980).  The 
proposed regulations failed to note that refusing partnership classification solely on the basis of 
limited liability had been rejected by the Board of Tax Appeals in Glensder Textile Co. v. 
Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).  This principle, however, is consistent with certain early 
classification efforts.  See, e.g., Susan P. Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability 
Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1504 (1999) (noting that the first definition of “associations” 
promulgated by Treasury Register 33 in 1914 “stated without exception that all limited 
partnerships would be taxed as corporations”). 
 12. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980).  Indicating further uncertainty within 
the Service on the classification of LLCs, General Counsel Memorandum 38,281, which was 
prepared in response to a request to clarify the basis upon which the Service could classify an 
LLC as an association taxable as a corporation, discusses a draft revenue ruling that would have 
classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,281 (Feb. 15, 1980).  
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After several announced postponements of the effective date of the amended 
regulations proposed in 1980,14 the Service bowed to negative comments15 and 
in 1983 withdrew the proposed changes.16  At the same time, the Service began 
a study of the criteria applied in the classification of non-corporate entities.17  
The further adoption of LLC statutes languished until the Service issued 
Revenue Ruling 88-76,18 which classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for 
federal income tax purposes.  With the federal tax classification somewhat 
clarified, other states moved to adopt LLC statutes.19  After a delay of several 
 
That memorandum reviewed whether an LLC could be classified as an association taxable as a 
corporation on the grounds that it bore the “other factor” of being afforded entity treatment, as 
evidenced by its ability to own property and to sue and be sued in its own name.  Id.  “Wyoming 
law treats a limited liability company exclusively as an entity separate from its owners.  We 
believe that such entity treatment is a corporate characteristic that can be considered significant 
within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).”  Id.  The memorandum concluded, 
however, that partnership classification was in that instance proper.  Id. 
 13. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401–471 (2001) (several sections have since been repealed).  
Uncertainty as to the viability of the LLC not only impacted the adoption of additional LLC 
statutes but also apparently dissuaded the use of the statutes in place.  As of February 22, 1988, 
only twenty-six Wyoming LLCs and sixty-three Florida LLCs had been formed.  See Ernest A. 
Seemann, The Florida Limited Liability Company: An Update, 14 NOVA L. REV. 901, 903 (1989-
1990). 
 14. See I.R.S. Announcement 82-140, 1982-45 I.R.B. 30; I.R.S. Announcement 82-60, 1982-
17 I.R.B. 23; I.R.S. Announcement 81-166, 1981-43 I.R.B. 21. 
 15. See, e.g., Proposed Regulations on “Limited Liability Companies” Are Criticized as 
Contrary to Congressional Intent and Detrimental to Overseas Investment, 15 TAX NOTES 187 
(Apr. 19, 1982). 
 16. I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31.  Additional amendments to the Kintner 
regulations were made in 1983.  The 1983 amendments related to the classification of limited 
partnerships, the power of limited partners to remove a general partner, and limitations on the 
liability of a general partner.  See generally T.D. 7889, 1983-1 C.B. 362; 48 Fed. Reg. 18802 
(Apr. 26, 1983). 
 17. See I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31.  This study focused on the Service’s 
acquiescence in Larson v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq., I.R.S. Announcement 1979-2 C.B. 
2, in which it was held that each of the four corporate characteristics would be given equal weight 
in distinguishing partnerships from associations taxed as corporations.  The Service also 
announced it would not issue further private letter rulings on the classification of LLCs until the 
completion of the study.  See Rev. Proc. 83-15, 1983-1 C.B. 676.  Prior to the withdrawal of the 
proposed regulations, the Service released I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982), 
classifying an LLC as an association taxable as a corporation because it possessed limited 
liability, centralized management, and continuity of life. 
 18. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.  I.R.S. Announcement 88-118, 1988-38 I.R.B. 25, 
released with Revenue Rul. 88-76, announced, albeit cryptically, the results of the study 
discussed in Announcement 83-4, including the continued acquiescence in Larson, as well as the 
Service’s intention to review its procedures for the granting of advance rulings to entities seeking 
partnership classification and the possible application of minimum net worth standards to certain 
entities classified as partnerships.  This study led to the promulgation of Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 
C.B. 798. 
 19. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
58 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:53 
years in publishing further binding pronouncements on the classification of 
LLCs, beginning in early 1993 the Service issued a series of additional revenue 
rulings addressing LLCs formed pursuant to the various states.20  The Service 
also issued numerous private letter rulings indicating whether or not particular 
LLCs qualified for partnership classification.21 
Meanwhile, belatedly and with little apparent enthusiasm, Congress 
indicated an interest in reviewing the issue and possibly addressing it through 
legislation.  On February 2, 1993, the Subcommittee on Select Revenue 
Measures of the Ways & Means Committee of the United States House of 
Representatives announced that it would schedule a hearing to “review the 
revenue impact of [the] LLC, and [its] effect on the two-tier corporate tax 
structure and the adequacies of the current classification analysis.”22  Those 
 
 20. See Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Virginia); 
Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Colorado); Rev. Rul. 
93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Nevada); Rev. Rul. 93-38, 
1993-1 C.B. 233 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Delaware); Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-2 
C.B. 308 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Illinois); Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-2 C.B. 310 
(addressing the classification of LLCs in West Virginia); Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-2 C.B. 312 
(addressing the classification of LLCs in Florida); Rev. Rul. 93-81. 1993-2 C.B. 314 (addressing 
the classification of LLCs in Rhode Island); Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316 (addressing the 
classification of LLCs in Utah); Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-2 C.B. 318 (addressing the classification 
of LLCs in Oklahoma); Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-2 C.B. 321 (addressing the classification of LLCs 
in Arizona); Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-1 C.B. 312 (addressing the classification of LLCs in 
Louisiana); Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-1 C.B. 314 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Alabama); 
Rev. Rul. 94-30, 1994-1 C.B. 316 (addressing the classification of LLCs in Kansas); Rev. Rul. 
94-51, 1994-2 C.B. 407 (addressing the classification of LLCs in New Jersey). 
 21. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-33-008 (May 6, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  94-07-030 
(Nov. 24, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-04-021 (Nov. 1, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  93-50-013 
(Sept. 15, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  93-35-063 (June 11, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-35-
062 (June 11, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-35-032 (June 4, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-33-
032 (May 24, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-31-010 (May 5, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  93-25-
048 (Mar. 30, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-25-039 (Mar. 26, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-
21-070 (Mar. 3, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-21-047 (Feb. 25, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-
20-045 (Feb. 24, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-20-019 (Feb. 18, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-
18-011 (Feb. 3, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-13-009 (Dec. 17, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-
10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-039 (Dec. 2, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-
08-027 (Nov. 27, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-42-025 (July 22, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-
27-033 (Apr. 8, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-26-035 (Mar. 26, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-
18-078 (Jan. 31, 1992); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  91-47-017 (Aug. 12, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
91-19-029 (Feb. 7, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-52-039 (Oct. 2, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-
30-013 (Apr. 25, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-29-019 (Apr. 19, 1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-
10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010 (June 16, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-
04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982).  Private Letter Rulings 8304138 and 9433008 held that particular LLCs 
would not receive partnership classification.  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-33-008 (May 6, 1994); 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29 1982). 
 22. Ways and Means Select Revenues Subcommittee Report on Referred Tax Issues, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 1993.  The full text of the announcement, as it relates to LLCs, reads: 
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PURPOSE 
  The hearing would focus on so-called “limited liability companies,” which have been 
utilized as an alternative to doing business as a partnership.  These companies represent a 
relatively new and unique business structure, and concerns have been raised that one 
purpose of the entity is to avoid the corporate income tax while providing economic 
benefits of doing business as an entity.  Because of the unique structure of limited liability 
companies, a review of current law and possible modifications would be considered as 
part of the hearing. 
ISSUE 
  Limited liability companies have evolved within the past five to six years as a new 
form of doing business.  These companies originate from State law, with each state statute 
that allows for the creation of such entities being slightly different.  The structure of these 
entities generally resembles a hybrid between a partnership and a corporation, 
incorporating certain aspects of a partnership such as pass-through treatment for tax 
purposes, flexibility regarding [the] number of, and who can be, owners, and the use of 
the entity’s debt to increase the basis of the owner’s interest.  At the same time, limited 
liability companies retain unique characteristics of a corporation such as continuity of life 
of the entity, operation of the day-to-day business like a corporation, and absence of 
personal liability of owners. 
  Because of the structure of these companies, there has been growing concern that the 
test currently used to determine whether an entity is a corporation or a partnership, for tax 
purposes, is inadequate.  At the very heart of the dispute are Treasury regulations that 
were issued in the 1960s for purposes totally unrelated to testing limited liability 
companies but which are used for such purpose.  The regulations, which were drafted to 
discourage the use of the corporate form as a means of abusing the pension rules, 
generally establish[ed] a four-factor-test that favors the finding of a partnership entity.  
When this test is applied to limited liability companies, the result, for tax purposes, may 
not accurately reflect the true nature of the entity. 
  Limited liability companies appear to be structured to take advantage of the tax 
benefits of a particular “business form” without the corresponding burdens or limitations.  
Although the growth of these entities is relatively new, if left unchecked, there is some 
concern that these companies could be a sanctioned way to undercut the two-tier system 
of corporate taxation. 
Id.  In her article, Barbara Kichheimer states: 
  On a related note, Weinberger [tax counsel to Senator Danforth] said it is time for 
Congress to “wake up and at least look at” the issue of limited liability companies.  While 
the IRS has basically deemed these entities worthy of being subjected to only a single 
level of tax, Congress has legislated rules at the federal level requiring corporations to 
meet all the requirements of subchapter S.  “You have the Treasury Department, the IRS, 
going with limited liability companies as the model of integration,” Weinberger said.  
These companies, however, have no congressional oversight.  He suggested Congress at 
least hold hearings and look into whether these companies cause a revenue drain, and are 
bad policy, or whether LLCs should replace S corporations. 
Barbara Kirchheimer, Revenue Constraints and Lack of Momentum May Hinder S Corp Reform, 
Danforth Aide Says, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 22, 1993; see also Congress May Examine IRS’ 
Position on LLCs in Future; Subchapter S Bill Gains Speed, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 72, at 
G-7 (Apr. 15, 1994); LLCs Status May Be Subject to Congressional Scrutiny, 1 J. LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMAPANIES 47 (1994); Surge in Limited Liability Co. Laws Seen Driving Move to 
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hearings were never scheduled.23  Still the tidal wave of the LLC advanced 
across the country, until at last Hawaii embraced the LLC form in 1997.24 
Nonetheless, the Kintner classification regulations did impose certain 
limits on the use of the LLC form, and continuing uncertainties over the tax 
classification of a single member LLC25 effectively precluded the use of the 
structure.  However, in order to avail themselves of the perceived benefits of 
classification as a partnership, rather than as an association taxable as a 
corporation, taxpayers needlessly expended significant time, money, and effort 
to eliminate “corporate characteristics” from organizational documents.  For 
those organizations with sufficient resources to retain qualified legal and 
accounting professionals, this expense was simply a cost of doing business.  
However, for smaller business organizations with neither the time nor money 
to spare, the Kintner classification regulations inevitably became a barrier to 
business.  Furthermore, the Service found itself expending more and more 
resources by responding to requests for private letter rulings on particular fact 
patterns and in drafting classification revenue rulings and revenue procedures.  
Recognizing the inequities of this system and the fact that developments in 
 
Corporate Integration, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 100, at G-2 (May 26, 1993); Tax Aide 
Discusses LLCs, S Corporations, and Health Care, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 15, 1994; 
 23. Telephone interview with Gloria Bryant, House Ways and Means Committee (Sept. 30, 
1994).  As observed by one commentator: 
  Here is what should have happened.  Prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 88-76, 
the IRS should have alerted congressional staff members that it was about to issue a 
revenue ruling treating Wyoming limited liability companies as partnerships rather than as 
corporations under the Kintner Regulations.  With the experience of master limited 
partnerships fresh in everyone’s mind, both the congressional staff and the IRS would 
have known that, once the private sector digested the information about limited liability 
companies, it would flock to that type of entity to circumvent the problems associated 
with other forms of business associations, especially S corporations.  Congress should 
then have decided whether or not to permit this circumvention of the Subchapter S rules.  
It would have been most sensible to engage in a full-scale review of conduits and to 
rewrite the rules so that they made more sense.  Congress, of course, has numerous 
pressing matters before it and may have lacked the time necessary to complete such a 
major project.  Still, Congress could have adopted stop-gap legislation, e.g., by making 
limited liability companies meet the Subchapter S standards as a prerequisite to being 
treated as conduits, until it had time to engage in a fuller review.  Instead, Congress 
remained inert, allowing virtually all of the states to pass legislation.  It may now be hard 
to put the bull back in the barn. 
William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences Under Federal Tax 
Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 32–33 (1995). 
 24. See Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 181–225 (effective 
Apr. 1, 1997) (current version at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101–428-1302 (LexisNexis 2004 
& Supp. 2005)). 
 25. While Rev. Proc. 95–10, 1995–1 C.B. 501, § 4.01 acknowledged that single member 
LLCs could be formed under certain statutes, it also provided that such an entity could not request 
an advance classification ruling.  Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] DISAPPOINTING DIOGENES 61 
organizational law had overtaken the Kintner regulations, the Service proposed 
and enacted a new tax classification regimen under which the classification of 
unincorporated associations would be governed by the voluntary election of 
the owners. 
II.  CHECK-THE-BOX, OR HOW THE STRUCTURAL LIMITS ON LLCS WERE 
ABANDONED 
In April, 1995, the Service raised the possibility of revising the 
classification regulations to provide for an elective regimen, and requested 
comments upon the feasibility and desirability of such a system.26 
The comments received on the simplification concept set forth in Notice 
95-14 were almost without exception favorable.  As set forth in the notice, 
domestic unincorporated associations would be allowed to elect their 
classification without regard to the presence or absence of the Kintner 
regulations.  Of particular import was the request in the notice for comments 
on the proper treatment of unincorporated, single-member organizations.  A 
hearing on these points was held on July 20, 1995.27 
 
 26. I.R.S. Notice 95–14, 1995–1 C.B. 297; see also Thomas E. Rutledge, IRS Considers End 
to Kintner Analysis of Unincorporated Associations, 18 LLC ADVISOR 4 (1995).  In I.R.S. Notice 
95–14, the Service stated: 
The existing classification regulations are based on the historical differences under local 
law between partnerships and corporations.  However, many states recently have revised 
their statutes to provide that partnerships and other unincorporated organizations may 
possess characteristics that have traditionally been associated with corporations, thereby 
narrowing considerably the traditional distinctions between corporations and partnerships.  
For example, some partnership statutes have been modified to provide that no partner is 
unconditionally liable for all of the debts of the partnership.  Similarly, almost all states 
have enacted statutes allowing the formation of limited liability companies.  These entities 
are designed to provide liability protection to all members and to otherwise resemble 
corporations, while generally qualifying as partnerships for federal tax purposes. . . .  One 
consequence of the narrowing of the differences under local law between corporations and 
partnerships is that taxpayers can achieve partnership tax classification for a non-publicly 
traded organization that, in all meaningful respects, is virtually indistinguishable from a 
corporation.  Taxpayers and the Service, however, continue to expend considerable 
resources in determining the proper classification of domestic unincorporated business 
organizations. . . .  In addition, small unincorporated organizations may not have 
sufficient resources and expertise to apply the current classification regulations to achieve 
the tax classification they desire. 
I.R.S. Notice 95–14, 1995–1 C.B. 297 
 27. See, e.g., ABA Tax Lawyers Embrace Check-the-Box Proposal and Say Extend it to 
Foreign Organizations, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 26, 1995; AICPA Strongly Supports Check-the-
Box Proposal for Domestic and Foreign Entities, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 28, 1995; IRS 
Approval of Simplified Business Classification System Urged at Hearing, DAILY TAX REPORT, 
July 21, 1995. 
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In May, 1996, the Service released proposed entity classification rules 
incorporating an elective regimen for both domestic and foreign entities which 
also addressed the classification of single member unincorporated 
organizations.28  The comments received on the proposed regulations were 
almost without exception supportive of the general check-the-box strategy, 
suggesting only minor revisions.  The one exception to the unanimity of 
support was the California Franchise Tax Board, which objected to the 
proposed regulations on the basis that California would treat all single member 
entities as corporations and that if Check-the-Box were adopted there would be 
different classifications under federal and state law.29 
The final Check-the-Box regulations were released on December 18, 1996 
with an effective date of January 1, 199730 and generally adopted the elective 
system contained in the proposed regulations.31  Breaking important new 
 
 28. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21989 (May 13, 1996).  
Those proposed regulations provided: (i) an elective regimen between partnership and corporate 
classification for domestic unincorporated associations with two or more members and a default 
classification as a partnership; (ii) an elective regimen regarding the classification of domestic 
single member unincorporated associations between sole proprietorships/branches and 
corporations with a default classification as a sole proprietorship/ branch; (iii) the designation of 
certain foreign organizations as per se corporations; and (iv) an elective regimen for all other 
foreign organizations with default classification being dependent upon the number  of members 
and the presence or absence of limited liability for all owners with the opportunity to elect a 
contrary classification.  Id.; see also Roger F. Pillow, John G. Schmalz & Samuel P. Starr, Check-
the-Box Proposed Regs. Simplify the Entity Classification Process, 85 J. TAX’N 72, 73 (1996); 
Thomas E. Rutledge & James B. Martin, Jr., The Proposed Check-the-Box Classification 
Regulations: What Might They Mean For You, 1 LLC ADVISOR 4 (1996). 
 29. See California Franchise Tax Board Opposes Single-Member Business Entity Election, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, August 21, 1996. 
 30. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 (Dec. 18, 1996).  The 
validity of the regulations was recently confirmed in Littriello v. United States, No. Civ.A. 
3:04CV–143–H, 2005 WL 1173277, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2005). 
 31. Reviews of the Check-the-Box classification regulations include WILLIAM S. MCKEE, 
WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS ¶ 3.08[1]–[5] (Warren, Gorham & Lamont eds. 2006) (3d ed. 1997); see Barbara C. 
Spudis, The “Check-the-Box” Regulations: Effective Entity Classification Under Section 7701, 
TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, 
FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCTURINGS, Oct.-Nov. 1997.  For a discussion of 
certain pit-falls and ambiguities in the Check-the-Box regulations, see, for example, Hugh M. 
Dougan et al., Check the Box—Looking Under the Lid, May 27, 1997.  In addition to simplifying 
entity classification, by de-linking state law organizational characteristics and tax classification, 
Check-the-Box had the salutary benefit of eliminating the drive to create an ever increasing menu 
of entities, entities which have been oft proposed to address perceived gaps in the weave of 
available organizations.  See, e.g., George W. Coleman & Robert R. Keatinge, Universal 
[Contractual] Organization Act, Aug. 7, 1995 (paper presented to the ABA Section of Business 
Law, Committees on Taxation and Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations 
introducing the so-called UNICORN); Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo 
Entrepreneurs: A Limited Liability Sole Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
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ground, the Check-the-Box regulations addressed the classification of single 
member unincorporated associations.  The appropriate classification of such 
entities was an oft debated and never solved question under the Kintner 
regulations.32 
Under Check-the-Box, single member LLCs have the option of either 
being classified as corporations or, in the alternative, treated as either a sole 
proprietorship, where the sole member is an individual, or as a branch/division, 
where the owner is a corporation or other business entity.33  Unless 
classification as a corporation is elected, the separate entity, while existing for 
purposes of state law, will be afforded no separate tax identity.34  Under the 
default rule, a single member unincorporated entity is treated as having no 
separate tax identity.35  As such, in parallel with the system applied to 
unincorporated associations with more than one member, an affirmative 
election is required to have the domestic single member unincorporated 
association taxed as a corporation. 
It is doubtful that it is possible to overstate the importance of the Service’s 
effort in this area.  While Revenue Ruling 88-7636 signified the acceptance of 
the LLC as a viable business structure with a predictable tax classification, the 
Check-the-Box regulations initiated the practical use of the single member 
LLC.  One common application of this structure is to provide limited liability 
for businesses that would otherwise operate as a sole proprietorship because of 
the disadvantages and complexities of either C or S corporation status.  
Another common application has been in the creation of wholly owned LLCs 
to serve as joint venture vehicles or as baskets in which to hold particular 
assets.  In addition, there are international and state tax planning 
opportunities.37  Keep in mind, however, that Check-the-Box addresses only 
 
381, 383 (2001); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business 
Organization Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1996); Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, 
What’s In a Name?: An Argument for a Small Business “Limited Liability Entity” Statute (With 
Three Subsets of Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 114 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, 
The Loneliest Number: The Unincorporated Limited Liability Sole Proprietorship, J. ASSET 
PROTECTION 46, 46–47 (May-June 1996). 
 32. See, e.g., Francis J. Wirtz & Kenneth L. Harris, Tax Classification of the One-Member 
Limited Liability Company, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 28, 1993. 
 33. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3(a) (2006); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (2006).  Such 
organizations will be referred to as “Tax-Nothings” for the balance of this article. 
 34. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) (2006). 
 35. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3(b)(ii) (2006). 
 36. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.  In Rev. Rul. 88-76, the Service determined that a 
Wyoming LLC would be classified as a partnership.  Id. 
 37. For discussions of the single member unincorporated entity with no tax identity and its 
use in various situations, see Christopher Barton, Much Ado About a Nothing: The Taxation of 
Disregarded Entities, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 30, 1997; David S. Miller, The Tax Nothing, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 3, 1997; William S. McKee et al., Issues Relating to Choice of Entity, Entity 
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the federal tax classification of single member LLCs; the individual states 
neither were nor are bound to follow that classification.38 
III.  STATE ADOPTIONS OF FEDERAL CLASSIFICATION, OR HOW GOING ALONG 
PUT THE STATE FISC AT RISK 
None of the states are bound by the federal tax classification of a business 
structure.  Rather, for purposes of its tax code, a state may classify business 
entities as it sees fit.  Most states have followed the rule of conformity, but 
there are noteworthy exceptions.39  As an example, our home state of Kentucky 
 
Characterization and Partnership Anti-Abuse Rules, in TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC AND 
FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES, AND OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES (PLI Tax 
Law and Estate Planning Handbook Series) (1997).  In I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-6 I.R.B., the 
Service announced that it would be proposing regulations intended to combat the use of hybrid 
Tax Nothings (Tax Nothing treatment for purposes of US taxation while treatment as an entity for 
foreign tax purposes) in situations which are considered abusive because they are structured to 
avoid foreign tax while at the same time avoiding Subpart F income treatment.  See also Steven 
Grodnitzsky, Notice 98–11 Not Intended to Attack Check-the-Box Regs. Treasury Says, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Jan. 26, 1998; IRS To Issue Regs on Hybrid Branches Used to Circumvent 
Subpart F, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 20, 1998; Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Talks About Foreign Hybrid 
Notice, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 22, 1998. 
 38. See generally Amy Hamilton, Check-the-Box Chaos? The State Tax Treatment Factor, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, May 29, 1997; Scott D. Smith, What Are States Doing on the Check-the-Box 
Regs?, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 18, 1997; see also States Must Address Business Entity Issue 
Following IRS Check-the-Box Rules, 22 DAILY TAX REPORT G-8, Feb. 3, 1997; California 
Groups Discussing Conforming to Federal Entity Classification Rules, DAILY TAX REPORT, Feb. 
24, 1997.  As most states “couple” their tax codes to the Internal Revenue Code, changes in 
federal tax law take effect, except to the degree that the states “decouple” state revenues.  For an 
exploration of this effect, see, for example, Michael H. Lippman & Sharlene E. Amitay, How Will 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 Affect State and Local Taxes?, 102 J. TAX’N 161 (2005). 
 39. See Bruce P. Ely, State Taxation of Subchapter S and Subchapter K Entities and Their 
Owners—An Overview, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education Presentation, Choice of Entity—
2006: Selecting Legal Form and Structure for Closely-Held Businesses and Ventures (Feb. 2, 
2006).  According to Ely: 
In most states, the decision to conform to the Check-the-Box regulations for income tax 
purposes was not controversial.  Almost all states that impose a corporate income tax, or 
its equivalent, have enacted legislation or announced in formal or informal guidance that 
they will classify an LLC in the same manner as it is classified for federal tax purposes. 
Id. at 322.  See generally Michael W. McLoughlin & Walter Hellerstein, State Tax Treatment of 
Foreign Corporate Partners and LLC Members After Check-the-Box, 8 STATE AND LOCAL TAX 
LAWYER 1, 3 (2003) (“For the most part, states follow the federal tax treatment of partnerships 
and treats them as pass-through entities.”).  Other state laws imposing an entity-level tax on 
business structures that, for federal tax purposes, are pass-through entities include: ALA. CODE 
§ 40-14A-22(a) (2003) (imposing net worth based “business privilege” tax on LLCs); CAL. REV. 
& TAX. CODE §§ 17941, 17942 (2006, 2004) (imposing entity-level franchise tax); 35 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/205(b), 5/201(d) (2004) (imposing 1.5% personal property replacement tax based on net 
income); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141.010(24), 141.040(5) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005) 
(classifying LLCs as corporations and subject to the greater of corporate or alternative minimum 
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was typical in following the Federal classification scheme.40  It was also 
typical, as we shall see, in not appreciating revenue implications of conforming 
to the Federal scheme41 and in reacting when revenue shortfalls occurred, 
although not in the specifics of its reaction.42 
 
calculation tax); Mich. Dept. of Treasury Revenue Admin. Bulletin 1999–9, available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/rab99-9_109073_7.pdf (Michigan Single Business Tax); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 77–A:2, 77–E:2 (2002) (subjecting LLCs that do business in the state 
to a 5% tax on dividends and interest, an 8.5% business profits tax, and the 0.75% business 
enterprise tax); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:10A-15.11 (2002) (obligating partnerships to pay 6.37% of 
New Jersey net income allocated to nonresident, noncorporate partners and 9.00% for all 
nonresident corporate partners); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5733.06, 5733.40, 5733.401 (2005) 
(imposing an 8.5% entity-level tax except where all owners give written consent to state tax 
jurisdiction); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8925 (2006) (subjecting LLCs, except certain 
professional LLCs, to 0.699% capital stock and franchise taxes); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4-
2007, 67-4-2105(a), 67-4-2106(a)) (2006) (applying excise tax of 6.5% of net earnings and 
franchise tax of $0.25 per $100 of net worth to LLCs, LLPs, and LPs); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 
§ 171.001 (2005) (taxing LLCs as though they are corporations for tax years ending prior to Jan. 
1, 2007, but not treating LPs, LLPs, or LLLPs in the same manner); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 25.05.500–25.05.570, 25.15.005–25.15.902 (2006) (subjecting all entities to business & 
occupations tax).  See generally Ely, supra note 39, at Appendices B & C; ROBERT R. KEATINGE 
& ANN E. CONAWAY, KEATINGE AND CONAWAY ON CHOICE OF BUSINESS ENTITY 373, 430 
(2006).  With respect to the changes in the Texas taxation of LLCs, as well as LLPs and limited 
partnerships for tax years ending on or after January 1, 2007, see generally Ira A. Lipstet, 
Franchise Tax Reformed: The New Texas Margin Tax, presented at 2006 Partnerships, Limited 
Partnerships, and LLCs at Austin, Texas (July 21, 2006). 
 40. Prior to the adoption of “tax modernization” in 2005, Kentucky income tax classification 
conformed itself to the federal tax classification.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.208 (1994) 
originally provided: 
(2) Any limited liability company which is treated as a partnership for federal income tax 
purposes shall be treated as a partnership in accordance with the provisions of KRS 
§ 141.206 for Kentucky income tax purposes. 
(3)Any limited liability company which is treated as a corporation for federal income tax 
purposes shall be treated as a corporation in accordance with the provisions of KRS 
§ 141.040 for Kentucky income tax purposes. 
Subsequent to Check-the-Box, the 1998 General Assembly amended KRS § 141.208 by deleting 
the above referenced subsections (2) and (3) and replacing them with a new subsection (2) which 
provided: 
(2) Any limited liability company shall be treated for Kentucky income tax purposes in 
the same manner as its tax treatment for federal income tax purposes. 
H.B. 666, § 1(2), Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998) (subsequently modified by H.B. 272, § 19, 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)).  Speaking specifically to the case of Kentucky but applying 
to some degree to all states whose revenue decline has been laid at the feet of the LLC, it may be 
that this was the point “that the wheels came off.”  The Kentucky General Assembly deleted the 
requirement that LLCs have at least two members, thereby enabling the SMLLC and its treatment 
as a Tax Nothing, a “tax planning opportunity” of exceptional utility, without an appreciation of 
its consequences. 
 41. As observed by Governor Fletcher in his 2005 State of the Commonwealth address: 
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IV.  THE DEBATE THAT NEVER WAS 
The speed with which the various states adopted the LLC form was 
notable.  In 1988 there were statutes in place in two states, Wyoming and 
Florida, neither of which would be characterized as leading commercial 
centers.43  In 1990 there were two statutory adoptions,44 four in 1991,45 and ten 
in 1992.46  As observed by Susan Pace Hamill: 
After the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) formally recognized the LLCs ability 
to be taxed as a partnership in 1988, interest in LLCs grew exponentially.  By 
the close of 1996, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had passed 
statutes allowing formation of LLCS within their jurisdictions.  In less than 
twenty years—a meteoric pace unprecedented in the development of business 
organizations—this new business form grew from obscurity to a viable new 
alternative for doing business.47 
As contrasted with the voluminous records maintained of federal 
legislative (and administrative) deliberations, the various states maintain 
relatively limited records of their deliberations.  As such, our criticism is of the 
 
In 1994 [the General Assembly] passed a good law for small businesses that allowed the 
formation of limited liability companies.  The law never anticipated that large out of state 
companies would use that structure as a way of avoiding corporate tax.  These loopholes 
are neither fair nor responsible. 
Governor Ernie Fletcher, State of the Commonwealth Address at the House Chambers of the 
State Capitol (Feb. 1, 2005). 
 42. Subsequent years saw budget shortfalls in the state budget, and the blame for the missing 
revenue was in substantial part placed upon the LLC.  In 2005, Kentucky adopted a substantial 
“modernization” of its income tax code, imposing a new regimen under which LLCs, including 
SMLLCs, LLPs, LPs, and a variety of other structures traditionally treated as flow-through, are 
subject to an entity level tax.  H.B. 272, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005).  Certain aspects of this legislation 
are reviewed in Rutledge & Vestal, supra note 6, at 26–29. 
 43. Florida adopted its LLC act in 1982 in an effort to attract to that state businesses 
organized in Central and South America in the form of a limitada, an analogous form.  See Geu, 
supra note 3, at 49.  Still, even at that early date, the debate was no more robust than it would be 
in the wave of 1990s adoptions.  Richard Johnson, Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 387 (1984).  Johnson states that “The purpose behind the legislation’s enactment was to 
lure capital to the state in order to add to the economic base of Florida.”  Id. at 387.  Florida 
hoped to attract foreign investment by having a familiar business organization.  Id.  In addition to 
attracting international investment, it was also thought that the LLC would encourage businesses 
to move to Florida.  Id.  “The committee reports were very optimistic as to the impact which the 
new entity would have on the business community.  One report even expected a ‘deluge of 
filings.’”  Id. at 387–88. 
 44. These states were Colorado and Kansas.  LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1:2, at 1-7 (2d ed., 2004). 
 45. These states were Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.  Id. 
 46. The 1992 adoptions were Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.  Id. 
 47. Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1459, 1460–61 (1998). 
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lack of debate reflected in an, charitably speaking, incomplete record.  Still, 
based on the feebleness of the available records, we have no reason to think a 
robust, but unrecorded, debate took place in other states or in other settings.  
The records that are available reflect a debate held at best first order 
generalities: the LLC is good for business;48 the LLC is needed to keep 
business formation fees in the state;49 the LLC is an uncomplicated alternative 
to the corporation;50 the LLC is good for in-state economic development;51 the 
 
 48. For example, in North Dakota, Sen. Wayne Stenehjem, Sponsor, testified in support that 
LLC legislation saying that they “represent an innovative and potentially very useful business 
tool for the citizens of North Dakota.”  Hearing on S.B. 2222 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 
1993 Leg., 53d Reg. Sess., at 1 (N.D., Jan. 25, 1993).  Sen. Karen Krebsbach, co-sponsor, 
testified that “anything we can do to induce and entice business is what we need to do, and this is 
a good vehicle to do that.”  Id. at 3. 
  Likewise, in Montana, Sen. Waterman, the bill’s sponsor, opened the hearing by stating, 
“S.B. 146 creates an exciting and innovating business entity in the state. . . .  S.B. 146 will 
enhance Montana’s ability to attract and promote businesses throughout the state.”  Hearing on 
S.B. 146 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1993 Leg., 53d Reg. Sess., at 3 (Mont., Jan. 21, 
1993).  David Owen, Montana Chamber of Commerce, stated that “S.B. 146 is a concept that is 
advantageous for small and family businesses, and professional service organizations.”  Id. at 4.  
Tom Morrison, a tax lawyer, testified that “Limited Liability Companies will help small 
businesses and that S.B. 146 would place Montana with the rest of the progressive states that feel 
Limited Liability Companies are helpful to small businesses.”  Id. at 4.  Additionally, Steven 
Bahls testified on his own behalf that LLC 
legislation will facilitate a welcome improvement in Montana’s business images. LLCs 
are pro-economic development, at virtually no cost.  And as Montana strives to be a 
leader not a follower in providing for small business, it makes great sense that Montana 
seize this opportunity now. If Montana wishes to compete for small business with 
surrounding states, LLC legislation is a practical necessity and a step toward the future. 
Id. at 7. 
 49. Sen. Chuck Blanchard, sponsor for Arizona’s LLC legislation, “explained it [S.B. 1084] 
had [been] very carefully drafted and present[ed] an exciting opportunity for Arizona to get on the 
‘band wagon’ early in creating a new business structure that is more flexible and more workable 
for smaller businesses.”  Hearing on S.B. 1084 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 
40th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 5 (Ariz., Feb. 12, 1992).  He also said it “would save accounting and 
attorney’s fees and would give Arizona a modest advantage for economic development in the 
1990s.”  Id. 
 50. For instance, Sen. Blanchard supported Arizona’s legislation partially on the basis of this 
generality.  See id. 
When LLC legislation was introduced in California, the California Chamber of Commerce 
testified in favor of the bill: 
LLCs offer business owners and investors the ability to achieve limited liability and avoid 
double taxation, without the necessity of meeting the many procedural requirements to 
qualify as a corporation.  California should quickly adopt this bill so that it will be 
competitive with 35 other states which have adopted LLCs, and the number is rapidly 
increasing. 
Hearing on S.B. 469 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Ways and Means, Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal., Aug. 
29, 1994). 
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  In Idaho, supporter Mike Brassey of the Idaho State Bar Association presented the bill to 
the Committee and remarked, “The ability to organized LLCs in Idaho will provide substantial 
organizational flexibility and operational advantages to businesses currently organized as 
partnerships.”  Limited Liability Companies Created: Hearing on H.B. 381 Before the H. Bus. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1993 Leg., 52d Reg. Sess., at 1 (Idaho, Mar. 5, 1993).  Ken Pursley of 
the Corporate Securities Section of the Idaho State Bar testified that LLCs would “work very well 
in Idaho enabling some to do business who can’t now. It is the ideal business form for small 
business.”  Id. 
 51. For example, in Alaska’s hearings on LLC legislation, the record indicates support was 
offered for the LLCs economic benefits: 
Representative Mulder stated that he didn’t understand all the specifics of HB 420, but 
felt it was a good move towards promoting economic development. . . .  [Brian Durrell, 
Attorney and CPA,] championed the bill as being very good for business in Alaska.  He 
said it would help streamline and stimulate business activity in Alaska. . . .  [Mr. Bob 
Manley, attorney,] express[ed] concern that Alaskans would lose business to other states 
from individuals desiring the formation of LLCs. 
Comm. Hearing and Analysis of H.B. 420, Before the H. Labor and Commerce Standing Comm., 
18th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Alaska, Mar. 8, 1994). 
  Likewise, in Arizona Sen. Blanchard emphasized that LLC legislation “would give 
Arizona a modest advantage for economic development in the 1990s.”  Hearing on S.B. 1084 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 40th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 5 (Ariz., Feb. 12, 
1992). 
  In California, the Committee on Revenue and Taxation’s comments on California’s 
legislation stated: 
The purpose of this bill is to allow the formation of limited liability companies (LLCs) in 
California.  Proponents argue that California must recognize limited liability companies in 
order to remain competitive with other states.  In the absence of a state LLC law, 
proponents argue, businesses organized as LLCs will conduct their business outside of 
California, resulting in a loss of jobs and business activity. 
Authorizes Formation of Limited Liability Companies, Hearing on S.B. 469 Before the Assemb. 
Comm. on Revenue and Tax’n, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal., Aug. 15, 1994).  Additionally, the sponsors 
of the bill argued that the availability of LLC status would improve California’s business climate 
by facilitating the formation of new businesses in California.  Corporation Tax: Limited Liability 
Companies, Hearing on S.B. 469 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Revenue and Tax’n, Reg. Sess., 
at 4 (Cal., Jan. 5, 1994).  The bill’s sponsors further expressed concern that without LLC 
legislation, the status of activities conducted by foreign LLCs would be unclear, thereby reducing 
their enthusiasm for doing business in California.  Id.; see Timothy M. Harris, Review of Selected 
1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. L.J. 281, 309–10 (1994) (“Chapter 1200 was enacted to 
make California a more competitive business environment. . . .  Proponents of Chapter 1200 
expect the flexibility LLCs offer will attract new businesses and create jobs in California.”). 
  In Hawaii, Rep. Yohiniga testified in support of Senate Bill 2723: 
Economic revitalization is vital to the improvement of the State’s current economic 
condition. Encouragement of capital investment, proactive rather than reactive state 
response to federal changes, fostering of well-paying jobs, fairness and equity in the 
impact of taxes and competing nationally and internationally in the business climate are a 
few of the grievous motives for the state to explore . . . 
J. OF THE H.R. OF THE STATE OF HAWAII, 18th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 802 (1996). 
  Regarding Montana’s LLC bill, Sen. Mignon Waterman, its sponsor, presented written 
testimony in support of the bill: 
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LLC is needed to create the perception that the state has progressive business 
laws;52 and the LLC is needed to avoid being the odd-state-out not having an 
 
The Montana Legislature has an opportunity to promote business development and 
improve its business climate through [LLC] legislation prepared by a State Bar of 
Montana committee. If Montana is to be competitive with other states seeking business 
development it needs this modern and flexible business alternative. 
Hearing on S.B. 146 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1993 Leg., 53d Reg. Sess., at Exhibit 
2 (Mont., Feb. 4, 1993).  Steven Bahls, Associate Dean and Professor at the University of 
Montana School of Law, presented a letter from the then-Governor of Montana Marc Racicot, 
dated January 11, 1993, which pledged support for the bill: “The Internal Revenue Services’ 
approval of Limited Liability Companies certainly requires that Montana adopt this type of 
business entity in order to remain competitive with surrounding states.”  Id. at Exhibit 4. 
  Additionally, when legislation was introduced in Nebraska, Sen. Kristensen, the bill’s 
sponsor, testified the following on the Senate floor: 
I think rarely does the Legislature get a chance to create a new business entity that will 
benefit such a large number of our citizen and also give us such great opportunities for 
new businesses, but also give us a very competitive edge to keep existing businesses in 
the State of Nebraska. 
J. OF THE S. OF THE STATE OF NEB., 93rd  Leg., 1st Sess., at 3399 (1993).  The Senator went on to 
state: 
We’ve had people from economic development begin to embrace this as an opportunity to 
lure additional businesses into Nebraska.  When we have new businesses come and look 
at the state, one of the new questions that they ask are, do you have limited liability 
companies?  We’ve not been able to say yes, up to this point.  And particularly we lose 
business to other states. 
Id. at 3406.  Jerry Sestak, a partner with the Omaha firm Seim, Johnson, Sestak & Quist and 
president-elect of the Nebraska Society of Certified Public Accountants, testified: 
It is our opinion that the State of Nebraska must continue to offer incentives to invite new 
businesses to locate within the State of Nebraska in order for the state to continue to 
prosper and grow.  I firmly believe that one of the incentives that will be considered by 
prospective future businesses, is whether the state has limited liability company 
legislation. 
Introducer’s Statement of Intent L.B. 121 Before the Comm. of Banking, Commerce and Ins., 
1993 Leg., 93d 1st Sess., at 24–25 (Neb., Jan. 26, 1993). 
  Also, regarding North Dakota’s legislation, Rep. Don Shide testified that passage of this 
LLC legislation will do a lot economically for the State of North Dakota.  Hearing on S.B. 2222 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1993 Leg., 53d Reg. Sess. 1 (N.D., Jan. 25, 1993). 
 52. J. OF THE H.R. OF THE STATE OF HAWAII, 18th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 582 (1996) (Rep. 
Yoshinaga remarked “[a]s in other areas, Hawaii lags behind other states in enacting a 
progressive business law.  This limited liability act will do much to improve the perception that 
this State is unfriendly to businesses.”). 
  These sentiments were conveyed during the hearings on Montana’s LLC legislation by 
Sen. Waterman and Prof. Steven Bahls.  See Hearing on S.B. 146, supra note 51, at Exhibits 2, 4. 
  Also, consider Sen Kristensen’s statements in support of Nebraska’s legislation.  J. OF 
THE S. OF THE STATE OF NEB., supra note 51, at 3399, 3406.  Sen. Kristensen also testified: 
[Limited Liability Companies will be] a very helpful tool for Nebraska.  We could 
become a leader in the country instead of being one of the last to do it. Certainly with 
surrounding states all having limited liability companies by the end of this year 
we’ll. . .we’ll be at a competitive disadvantage by not having this business entity. 
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LLC act.53  The failure to debate the merits of the LLC concept, beyond the 
first order generalities that the LLC form would be “good for business”54 or 
that adoption of the LLC form was required to maintain competitive posture of 
the various states inter se, masked three separate policy matters that should 
have been thoroughly vetted: first, the policy implications incumbent in 
creating a structure that would be utilized by those who would have previously 
used the partnership or limited partnership forms with attendant joint and 
several liability to creditors; second, the fiscal implications of extending pass-
through taxation to firms that, not related to the previous organizational forms, 
might have chosen the corporation and entity-level taxation;55 and, third, the 
 
Introducer’s Statement of Intent L.B. 121 Before the Comm. of Banking, Commerce and Ins., 
1993 Leg., 93d 1st Sess., at 9–10 (Neb. 1993).  Additionally, Robert Berkshire of the Nebraska 
State Bar Association testified: “Certainly the Nebraska State Bar Association feels that this is a 
constructive legislation that keeps Nebraska competitive, as far as creating a business climate for 
business organizations.”  Id. at 21. 
  In a letter from the State of New York Executive Chamber dated July 26th, 1994, former 
Governor Mario M. Cuomo wrote: 
The bill [S. 7511–A], is part of our continuing effort to be aggressively hospitable to 
business. . . .The bill will help attract business to New York State. . . .  Adoption of LLC 
legislation in New York is a significant step in promoting New York as a competitive 
location for conducting and establishing business enterprises . . . .  [S. 7511–A] will 
provide the resources and tools to enable businesses to create more jobs, right now! 
1994 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2985 (McKinney).  The New York State Executive Department also 
indicated its support of the bill in a memorandum: 
The bill will attract businesses to New York State . . . The bill provides an attractive 
alternative to partnerships, corporations and trusts and should be particularly desirable for 
foreign investors and entrepreneurs.  Adoption of LLC legislation in New York will be a 
significant step in promoting New York as a competitive location for conducting and 
establishing business enterprises. 
Id. at 2773. 
 53. In hearings regarding Nebraska’s legislation, Sen. Kristensen and Robert Berkshire 
conveyed this generality in their remarks.  See Introducer’s Statement of Intent, supra note 52, 93 
Leg., at 9, 10, 21, 24–25.  In a telephone interview, Doug Williams, Deputy Fiscal Officer, 
Vermont Joint Fiscal Office, indicated that when Vermont’s LLC legislation (H. 112) was 
proposed it was presented as a “housekeeping detail.”  Telephone interview with Doug Williams 
(June 11, 2003).  “The general sentiment was that if Vermont was to remain competitive with 
other states in attracting and keeping businesses, then this bill must be passed.”  Id. 
 54. Hearing on A.B. 655, Before the Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1991 Leg., 66th Sess., 
at 19 (Nev., May 20, 1991) (where testimony was given to the effect that after reviewing A.B. 
655 and limited liability companies, lawmakers felt it would help bring more diversified 
companies to Nevada). 
 55. Noteworthy exceptions to the lack of analysis were California and New York.  See, e.g., 
CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD-RESEARCH BUREAU, ASSESSING THE STATE REVENUE 
IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LEGISLATION (Mar. 1993); Marilis Carson, Tax 
Revenues Will Suffer, But Limited Liability Companies May Be Here to Stay, 3 STATE TAX 
NOTES 802 (1992); F.R. Nagle, California FTB Members Explain Revenue Consequences of LLC 
Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 17, 1993; Kevin Sack, New Type of Company Stirs Tax Worry in 
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social implications of moving business entity law in directions (perhaps) 
inconsistent with popular conceptions. 
The policy, fiscal, and social issues inherent in the adoption of the LLC 
form were not debated much at all in the various state legislatures, a failure 
noted by other analysts.56  As to the LLC debates, Bill Callison has observed: 
. . . legislators failed to consider the public policy aspects of expansive limited 
liability protection before they acted, and the expansion of limited liability 
protection occurred for pragmatic rather than theoretical or normative reasons.  
In a sense, the limited liability movement was unchallenged and its success 
came too easily.57 
With respect to the LLP statutes, Bob Hamilton has been clear in his 
indictment: the expansion of limited liability to the general partnership was the 
product of “gross overreaching by members of the legal profession.”58  He also 
noted the lack of a clear public discussion of the implications of the statutory 
change: 
 
Albany, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1992, at 36 (“State lawmakers said this week that efforts to create a 
new kind of business entity in New York had been seriously wounded by new projections 
showing that the businesses could mean the state would lose up to $65 million a year in 
revenue.”); Lee A. Sheppard, New York Contemplates Cost of Partnership Treatment for Limited 
Liability Companies, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 7, 1992 (as amended by Lee A. Sheppard, 
Correction: New York Limited Liability Companies, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 8, 1992).  
California imposes an entity level franchise tax on LLCs.  CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17942 
(2004).  As this levy is not subject to apportionment based upon the state or states in which the 
LLC’s income is earned, it has been declared unconstitutional under the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  Northwest Energetic Services, LLC v. Calif. 
Franchise Tax Board, No. CGC-05-437721 (San Francisco Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006).  The potential 
revenue impact in New York was addressed in a memorandum transmitted March 20, 1992 in 
support of the New York LLC Act, it being recognized that there could be a loss in revenue from 
“a decline in the use of corporations,” but with offsetting fee revenue and increased individual tax 
revenues.  Memorandum reproduced in N.Y. LLC FORMS AND PRACTICE MANUAL (2004); see 
also supra note 41. 
 56. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 4, at 964 (“Based on the lack of legislative debate and 
conversation concerning the expansion of limited liability, LLCs were not the product of the 
public interest model of legislation.”).  Whether there has been a departure from public 
expectations is open to debate.  See, e.g., Rands, supra note 23, at 17 (“The private sector 
frequently desires a form of business organization that will entail limited liability for investors 
and be treated as a conduit for federal income tax purposes.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 4, at 953–54, 961.  Callison notes that the expansion of 
limited liability “resulted from a confluence of evolutionary forces and political power,” 
including the erosion of the strict treatment of unlimited liability and partnership taxation in the 
1960s and early 1970s, and the development of other means of avoiding personal liability.  Id.  
The third factor Callison cites is that “business lawyers advocated for LLC legislation without 
organized resistance from the plaintiffs’ tort bar or other interested parties.”  Id. 
 58. Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth 
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1090–91 (1995). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
72 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:53 
The argument that this broadening of limited liability is necessary to make the 
shield of limited liability against malpractice claims ‘more perfect’ seems to 
me to be a pretext for quietly obtaining limited liability for all partners in 
general partnerships without telling the world about it.59 
The point is not a subtle one.  We are not saying that the debate was 
inadequate, that surely if there had been just a bit more debate the outcome 
would have been different (and better).  One of us, a self-described old-
fashioned liberal, tends to believe that his opinions will prevail if there is 
adequate debate.  The other, a self-described fiscal conservative, wishes there 
had been informed debate as a resource for preserving the resultant situation.  
But the reality is that neither can cite what did take place in support of his 
position.  There was not just a bit too little debate; there was effectively none.  
Zero.  Zilch.  Nada.  Nehil. Τιποτα. 
How little debate was there?  It is hard to tell.  The various state 
legislatures keep quite varied levels of legislative history.  Unfortunately, the 
norm seems to be that states keep no verbatim record of floor debates and have 
no printed records of the all-important committee deliberations. 
As a first-order approximation, one can go to the legislative voting records.  
Each of the states does keep a record of the vote on final passage of bills which 
become law.  Below we report the percentage of votes in favor on final passage 
in each house of the legislature of the initial LLC statute.  Where there was 
only a voice vote recorded, we include it as a unanimous vote, but mark it to 
indicate that it was a voice vote. 
 
Final Passage of Initial LLC Act 
State House Senate 
 Yea Nay Yea Nay 
Alabama60 88 0 19 0 
Alaska61 38 0 15 5 
Arizona62 53 3 30 0 
Arkansas63 86 0 33 0 
California64 78 0 39 0 
 
 59. Id. at 1091. 
 60. Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Ala. Laws 1425–60 (current version at 
ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1–10-12-61 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005)). 
 61. Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 1–55 (current version at 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010–10.50.995 (2004)). 
 62. Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws 394–424 (current version at 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601–29-857 (1998 & Supp. 2005)). 
 63. Small Business Entity Tax Pass Through Act, 1993 Ark. Acts 2928–98 (current version 
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101–4-32-1401 (2001 & Supp. 2005)). 
 64. Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Cal. Stat. 7297–7413 (current 
version at CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000–17656 (2006)). 
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Final Passage of Initial LLC Act 
State House Senate 
 Yea Nay Yea Nay 
Colorado65 57 6 34 0 
Connecticut66 142 0 35 0 
Delaware67 41 0 16 1 
District of Columbia68 Council: 12 Yeas; 0 Nays 
Florida69 108 0 38 0 
Georgia70 160 1   
Hawaii71 51 0 25 0 
Idaho72 66 0 35 0 
Illinois73 111 0 57 0 
Indiana74 99 0 48 0 
Iowa75 93 2 44 0 
Kansas76 88 35 39 0 
Kentucky77  92 0 36 2 
Louisiana78  98 0 38 1 
 
 65. Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 414–460 (current 
version at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101–7-80-1101 (2006)). 
 66. Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn. Acts 884–910 (current version 
at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100–34-242 (2005 & Supp. 2006)). 
 67. Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Del. Laws 1329–1359 (current version at DEL. 
CODE ANN. §§ 18-101–18-1109 (2005)). 
 68. Limited Liability Company Act of 1994, 41 D.C. Reg. 3010–50 (May 27, 1994) (current 
version at D.C. CODE §§ 29-1001–29-1075 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2006)).  The Council of 
the District of Columbia includes 13 members.  One council member was absent for this vote. 
 69. Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 1982 Fla. Laws 580–603 (current version at 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.01–608.77 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006)). 
 70. Georgia Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Ga. Laws 123–288 (current version at 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100–14-11-1109 (2003)).  The recorded vote for the Georgia State 
Senate is unavailable. 
 71. Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 181–225 (current 
version at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101–428-1302 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005)). 
 72. Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws 760–90 (current version 
at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 53-601–53-672 (2000 & Supp. 2006)). 
 73. Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Ill. Laws 2529–63 (current version at 805 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1–60-1 (LexisNexis 2005)). 
 74. Indiana Business Flexibility Act, 1992 Ind. Acts 1970–2023 (current version at IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1–23-18-13-1 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2006)). 
 75. 1992 Iowa Acts 238–69 (current version at IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100–490A.1601 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2006)). 
 76. Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws 585–610 (current version 
at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601–17-7656 (2005)). 
 77. Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Ky. Acts 1087–1132 (current version at 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001–275.455 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005)). 
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Final Passage of Initial LLC Act 
State House Senate 
 Yea Nay Yea Nay 
Maine79     
Maryland80 128 3 44 0 
Massachusetts81 151 0 37 0 
Michigan82 102 0 34 0 
Minnesota83 129 2 57 0 
Mississippi84 121 0 52 0 
Missouri85 146 1 31 0 
Montana86 90 8 47 0 
Nebraska87 Unicameral Legislature: 43 Yeas, 0 Nays 
Nevada88 58 3 24 0 
New Hampshire89     
New Jersey90 76 0 33 0 
New Mexico91 62 4 34 0 
 
 78. Limited Liability Company Law, 1992 La. Acts 2083–2153 (current version at LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1315–1369 (1994 & Supp. 2006)). 
 79. Maine Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Me. Laws 2168–2207 (current version at 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.31, §§ 601–762 (1996 & Supp. 2005)).  The vote is unavailable; an 
unrecorded voice vote was taken. 
 80. Maryland Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Md. Laws 3288–3377 (current version 
at MD. CODE  ANN. [CORPS. & ASS’NS] §§ 4A-101–4A-1103 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005)). 
 81. Massachussetts Limited Liability Company Act, 1995 Mass. Acts 1008–34 (current 
version at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C §§ 1–69 (LexisNexis 2005)). 
 82. Michigan Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 138–171 (current 
version at MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 450.4101–450.5200 (LexisNexis 2001)). 
 83. Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Minn. Laws 1185–1288 (current 
version at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01–960 (West 2004)). 
 84. Mississippi Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Miss. Laws 215–50 (current version at 
MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 79-29-101–79-29-1204 (2001 & Supp. 2006)). 
 85. Missouri Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Mo. Laws 965–1011 (current version at 
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347-010–347-740 (West  2001 & Supp. 2006)). 
 86. Montana Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Mont. Laws 269–312 (current version at 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35.8.101–35.8.1307 (2005)). 
 87. Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Neb. Laws 333–442 (current version at NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 21-2601–21-2653 (1997)). 
 88. Nevada Limited Liability Company Act, 1991 Nev. Stat. 1292–1319 (current version at 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.011–86.590 (2005)). 
 89. Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 N.H. Laws 323–65 (current version at N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1–304-C:85 (LexisNexis 2005)).  The vote is unavailable; an unrecorded 
voice vote was taken. 
 90. New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 N.J. Laws 1215–52 (current version at 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1–42:2B-70 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] DISAPPOINTING DIOGENES 75 
Final Passage of Initial LLC Act 
State House Senate 
 Yea Nay Yea Nay 
New York92 146 0 60 0 
North Carolina93 94 3 40 0 
North Dakota94 78 3 48 0 
Ohio95 95 0 33 0 
Oklahoma96 88 7 44 2 
Oregon97 47 12 26 3 
Pennsylvania98 199 0 49 0 
Rhode Island99 69 0 43 0 
South Carolina100     
South Dakota101 62 2 35 0 
Tennessee102 91 6 30 0 
Texas103   31 0 
Utah104 63 0 24 0 
 
 91. Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 N.M. Laws 2753–2860 (current version at N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-4–53-19-63 (2003 & Supp. 2005)). 
 92. New York Limited Liability Company Law, 1994 N.Y. Laws 3240–3324 (current 
version at N.Y. [LTD. LIAB. CO.] LAW §§ 34-101–34-1403 (McKinney 2006)). 
 93. North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080–1147 
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 57C-1-01–57C-10-07 (2005)). 
 94. Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 N.D. Laws 390–497 (current version at N.D. 
CENT. CODE  §§ 10-32-01–10-32-156 (2005)). 
 95. Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Ohio Laws 634–846 (current version at OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01–1705.58 (West 1994 & Supp. 2006)). 
 96. Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 483–507 (current 
version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000–2060 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006)). 
 97. Oregon Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Or. Laws 435–60 (current version at OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 63.001–63.990 (2005)). 
 98. Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Pa. Laws 703–73 (current version at 15 PA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 8901–8998 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006)). 
 99. Rhode Island Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 1108–50 (current 
version at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1–7-16-75 (1999 & Supp. 2005)). 
 100. South Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 S.C. Acts 4856–4919 (current 
version at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101–33-44-1208 (2006)).  The vote is unavailable; an 
unrecorded voice vote was taken. 
 101. Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 S.D. Sess. Laws 535–67 (current version at S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34-1–47-34-59 (2000 & Supp. 2003)). 
 102. Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 654–754 (current 
version at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-101–48-249-1133 (Supp. 2005)). 
 103. 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3161–3236 (current version at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 
1528n, §§ 1.01–11.07 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2006)).  No vote was recorded in the Texas House 
of Representatives. 
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Final Passage of Initial LLC Act 
State House Senate 
 Yea Nay Yea Nay 
Vermont105     
Virginia106 96 0 35 1 
Washington107 91 0 46 3 
West Virginia108     
Wisconsin109 98 0 32 0 
Wyoming110 58 33 24 0 
 
The results are somewhat astounding.  Among the states for which votes 
were recorded, the average affirmative vote on the initial LLC statute was 
97%.  Twenty of the states and the District of Columbia had a unanimous vote 
on the initial LLC statute.  In only three states were the total “no” votes in 
excess of 10%.111  Of eighty-eight chamber votes for which a recorded roll call 
is available, there was unanimous approval in sixty-two of the votes, an 
astonishing rate of 70.5%. 
Now it is possible that such lopsided legislative votes could have been the 
product of an intense debate, over the course of which virtually every mind in 
each legislative body was convinced of the merit of the proposed legislation.  
Such is the deliberative model of the legislative process.  We would like to 
think that the legislatures of our states occasionally operate in this classically 
deliberative manner.  But we are in this instance unconvinced that this was 
such a case.  The record simply does not reflect an in-depth consideration of 
the question presented.  Rather, the limited legislative history resources of the 
 
 104. Utah Limited Liability Company Act, 1991 Utah Laws 991–1006 (current version at 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-101–48-2c-1902 (2002 & Supp. 2006)). 
 105. 1996 Vt. Acts & Resolves 567–701 (current version at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001–
3162 (1997 & Supp. 2005)).  The vote is unavailable; an unrecorded voice vote was taken. 
 106. Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 1991 Va. Acts 212–28 (current version at VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000–13.1-1080 (2006)). 
 107. 1994 Wash. Sess. Laws 1018–73 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
25.15.005–25.15.902 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006)).  The Senate amended the Act, and the House 
concurred at a vote of 87-0. 
 108. West Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 1992 W. Va. Acts 305–57 (current 
version at W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31B-1-101–31B-13-1306 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006)).  
The vote is unavailable; an unrecorded voice vote was taken. 
 109. 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 708–74 (current version at WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.01–183.1305 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2005)). 
 110. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537–49 (current 
version at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101–17-15-144 (1999)). 
 111. Kansas, 78.4% positive vote among two chambers; Oregon, 82.9% positive vote among 
two chambers; and Wyoming, 71.3% positive vote between two chambers. 
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states support the conclusion that the debate simply did not happen, not the 
conjecture that an unrecorded debate occurred and all were convinced. 
Given the lack of legislative history resources in the states, the only 
information we have available is anecdotal.  But in this case the anecdotal 
evidence is telling. 
In our home state of Kentucky, the recollections of the participants suggest 
that no significant debate occurred over the revenue implications of the bill,112 
the committee assignments were inconsistent with a recognition that a 
discussion was appropriate,113 and the bill lacked the “fiscal statement” which 
would have been attached to the record had the bill been perceived as having 
any revenue or spending implications.114 
Indeed, the record is silent as to any state having addressed in any 
meaningful way the revenue implications of its proposed LLC statute.  
Looking beyond the official record, we made inquiries of various practicing 
attorneys and academics involved in the process of drafting and seeing through 
to the adoption of the various LLC acts.  As observed by one practitioner from 
a Midwest state: 
I can confirm that from my perspective as chair of the . . . State Bar 
Association’s LLC Committee, the . . . Legislature neither considered nor 
appreciated the tax or liability consequences of adopting the . . . LLC Act.  The 
 
 112. The Republican co-sponsor of the legislation remembers that the revenue implications 
were discussed.  The Democratic co-sponsor does not remember any discussion of the revenue 
implications of the bill.  Jim Jordan, Limited Liability’s Unlimited Appeal, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Feb. 5, 2003, at A1.  Former Governor Patton, who was the Lieutenant Governor at the 
time the LLC bill was passed, stated that the LLC bill “sort of slid in under the radar.”  Id. 
 113. The bill creating the Kentucky LLC was referred to the Committee on Business 
Organizations and Professions and to the Rules Committee in the Senate, and to the Judiciary 
Committee in the House.  In neither chamber was the bill referred to the respective Committee on 
Appropriations and Revenue.  Kentucky Legislature Homepage, Final Legislative Record, Senate 
Bill 184 (1994), http://www.lrc.state.ky.us/recarch/94rs/bills/sb184.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 
2006).  However, measures which have any revenue implications are routinely referred to the 
Committees on Appropriations and Revenue.  KY. HOUSE R. P. 40 (2006), available at 
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/house/hserules06.pdf; KY. SENATE R. P. 40 (2006), available at 
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/senate/senrules06.pdf. 
 114. Under the rules of the Kentucky Legislature, a proposed statute can be the subject of a 
fiscal impact statement.  KY. HOUSE R. P. 52 (2006) available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/house/ 
hserules06.pdf; KY. SENATE R. P. 52 (2006), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/senate/ 
senrules06.pdf.  This statement is designed to predict the fiscal implications of a change in a 
statute.  A fiscal impact statement is prepared at the request of a sponsor of a bill or the chair of a 
relevant committee.  Id.  In the case of the LLC bill, a fiscal impact statement was prepared, but it 
dealt only with the cost of reprogramming computers in the office of the Secretary of State, not 
with the revenue implications of creating the LLC form. 
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. . . Legislature, in order to protect the innocent and the dumb, does not keep a 
legislative history.115 
A respected authority in this area from an Atlantic seaboard state, in response 
to the question “What consideration was given in your state at the time your 
LLC Act was adopted to the possible revenue implications of the act,” said “It 
was not considered.”116 
V.  THE RISK SHIFTING DEBATE THAT WAS BARELY HELD 
Notwithstanding occasional protests to the contrary, limited liability does 
provide societal benefits by promoting capital formation without the 
supervisory expenses incident to personal liability.117  Still, the risk shifting 
possibilities of the creation of new limited liability entities (LLEs) does not 
appear to have been doubted except within the context of professional, 
particularly legal, firms.118  One area in which we have not seen evidence of an 
unwarranted shift in risk is in the area of tort claims.  Tort claimants are almost 
by definition involuntary creditors, and they do not have the option of selecting 
between the well-capitalized LLC, the thinly capitalized corporation, or the 
judgment-proof individual as their debtor.  The debates on the adoption of the 
LLC are silent as to the risk-shifting that could take place with the expanded 
use of the new structure.119  We have seen the traditional law of piercing the 
corporate veil applied to LLCs,120 and we have seen the expansion of statutory 
 
 115. Letter to Thomas E. Rutledge (May 25, 2005) (copy on file with Thomas E. Rutledge).  
Name of state not included in order to protect the anonymity of the speaker. 
 116. Telephone Interview with Thomas E. Rutledge (Feb. 17, 2006).  Name of authority not 
included in order to protect the anonymity of the speaker. 
 117. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 40–62 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability 
and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93–97 (1985).  But see Richard A. Booth, Limited 
Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 140, 144, 147 (1994). 
 118. See generally Susan Saab Fortney, Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues 
Related to Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 399 (1998); Susan Saab 
Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences: The Traps of Limited 
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717 (1997); Robert R. Keatinge, The Floggings 
Will Continue Until Morale Improves: The Supervising Attorney and His or Her Firm, 39 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 279 (1998); N. Scott Murphy, It’s Nothing Personal: The Public Costs of Limited 
Liability Law Partnerships, 71 IND. L.J. 201 (1995). 
 119. See, e.g., R. Bruce Thompson II, The Creation of North Carolina’s Limited Liability 
Corporation Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 187 (1997) (“The NCBA’s choice of liability 
alternative number one was based on the experience of other states.  The only opposition to LLC 
legislation in other states came from the plaintiffs’ bar.”).  An interesting debate on this issue 
appears in Larry E. Ribstein & Mark A. Sargent, Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future of 
Limited Liability Entities, 52 BUS. LAW. 605, 641–645 (1997). 
 120. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2:55 n.7 (2006); Rebecca J. 
Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the Common Law 
Doctrine Into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 119–22 (2001); see Northern Tankers 
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exceptions to the rule of limited liability.121  There has been no showing that 
making limited liability more broadly available increases the possibility 
(likelihood) that the debtor will be a thinly capitalized business entity.122  We 
 
(Cyprus) Ltd. v. Backstrom, 967 F.Supp. 1391, 1398–1409 (D. Conn. 1997) (applying alter ego 
theory in the context of, among other points, intermingling of assets, common ownership, 
inadequate capitalization, and failure to observe corporate formalities, the veils of numerous 
entities, including LLCs, were pierced); Mills v. Webster, 212 B.R. 1006, 1007, 1009–10 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that the veil of the LLC was not pierced); Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., Inc., 
973 F.Supp. 1320, 1335–36 (D. Utah 1997) (finding that the veil of the LLC was not pierced); 
Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability 
Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43 (1994); J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability 
and Veil Piercing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1063, 1067 (2003); Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual 
Responsibility in the Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 348–54 (1998); Eric Fox, 
Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1994); 
Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 1 (1997). 
 121. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §§ 138.448(1), 139.185, 141.340(3) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 
2005)  (imposing upon the managers of a manager-managed LLC and upon the members of a 
member-managed LLC joint and several liability for, respectively, gasoline and special fuels 
taxes, sales and use taxes and withholding taxes, each with a retroactive effective date of July 15, 
1994).  See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, Limited Liability (or Not): Reflections on the Holy 
Grail, 51 S.D. L. REV. 417 (2006) (reviewing statutory exceptions to the otherwise available rule 
of limited liability); Allan G. Donn, Is the Liability of Limited Liability Entities Really Limited?, 
American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education Presentation (Feb. 2, 2006) (surveying 
protection of managers and owners of an entity against liability arising from claims against the 
organization or its co-owners). 
 122. It needs to be recognized, however, that expansions in limited liability forms have 
occasionally been accompanied by measures that increase protections for involuntary creditors.  
In 2000, in connection with the adoption of rules sanctioning the use of LLCs, LLPs, and PSCs 
by Kentucky attorneys, KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.022(f) (2000), the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted 
rules requiring that firms so organized maintain minimum amounts of malpractice insurance or 
other assets available to satisfy injured clients.  KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.024 (2000); see also Thomas E. 
Rutledge & Douglas C. Ballantine, Kentuck[y] Supreme Court Considers Rule Permitting 
LLCs/LLPs/PSCs, LLC ADVISOR (August 20, 1999); James C. Seiffert et al., Kentucky Supreme 
Court Approves the Practice of Law in Limited Liability Entities, KY. BAR ASSOC. BENCH & 
BAR, at 53 (2000) (discussing adoption of KY. SUP. CT. R. §§ 3.022, 3.024 and their 
implications).  Similar rules have been adopted in other states.  See generally COLO. R. CIV. P. 
265I.A. (2006); IND. ADMISSION & DISCIPLINE R. 27(h) (2006); MASS. SUP. CT. R. 3:06(3) 
(2006); OHIO SUP. CT. R. § III (2006); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:5.7(b)(2004); Sheldon I. Banoff & 
Steven F. Pflaum, Limited Liability Legal Practice: New Opportunities and Responsibilities for 
Illinois Lawyers, 17 CHI. B. ASS’N. REC. 37 (2003).  See also Anthony E. Davis, Special Issue 
Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers: Article and Response: Professional Liability 
Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 211, 216–220 (1996) 
(arguing that by denying coverage for activities that, with proper planning and caveats, are 
permitted by the disciplinary rules, such as conflicts of interest, office- and cost-sharing, and 
activities undertaken as the officer or director of a client, insurers preclude attorneys from 
engaging in particularly problematic behavior).  But see Charles Silver, Professional Liability 
Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233 
(1996) (arguing that while Davis may be correct as to the effect of limitations on coverage, he is 
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need as well to recognize the minimal likelihood of reporting, either in the 
press or in published rulings, of the undoubted situations in which a worthy 
tort claimant has dropped a claim in the face of a judgment-proof tortfeasor, 
the burdens of waging an action to pierce the veil, and the possibility 
(likelihood) of a bankruptcy filing further delaying or entirely precluding any 
actual recovery. 
VI.  THE REVENUE QUESTIONS THAT ESCAPED DEBATE 
In retrospect, it seems almost irresponsible of the various state legislatures 
to have passed their LLC statutes into law and then continued to update those 
statutes (conform them to) post Check-the-Box without exploring the revenue 
implications of the decision.123  At the same time, the various state revenue 
commissions’ failure to appreciate the consequences of Check-the-Box and the 
single-member LLC (SMLLC) needs to be highlighted, as it was upon their 
expertise that the state legislatures relied.124  One of the three essential failures 
of the reform process in the United States has been that “social costs have been 
 
in error in believing that coverage limitations are put in place for reasons of professional 
regulation as contrasted with generally applicable underwriting principles).  Malpractice coverage 
is at times also required in the medical community.  See American Medical Association, Liability 
Insurance Requirements, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4544.html. The AMA 
identifies Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island and Wisconsin as mandating malpractice coverage for certain professions, with California, 
Missouri, Arizona, and Indiana having statutes mandating insurance coverage for admission to 
certain hospital privileges.  Id.  These statutes are not all limited in scope to medical doctors.  Id.  
For example, the Connecticut mandatory insurance statute extends to osteopaths, chiropractors, 
nature therapists, and podiatrists; the Georgia statute appears to be limited to doctors of 
optometry; and the Kansas statute encompasses pharmacists, physicians, podiatrists, optometrists, 
physical therapists, certified nurse anesthetists, and dentists.  Id. 
 123. ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNOR. PAUL E. PATTON, SECURING KENTUCKY’S FUTURE 
48 (2003) (“In 1994 the legislature authorized the LLC form of business organization in 
Kentucky and created the largest loophole in the history of our tax code.”)  This statement is at 
best hyperbole.  To the extent the revenue “loss” was based on the SMLLC, the “loophole” arose 
in 1997 out of actions of the IRS and the subsequent decision of Kentucky to allow the formation 
of single member LLCs.  Prior revenue loss was limited to entities formed as LLCs (exempt from 
license tax) that would have otherwise been organized as corporations (subject to the license tax) 
and not as partnerships, limited partnerships, or unincorporated divisions.  Further revenue “loss” 
can as well be ascribed to the fact that Kentucky applied a multi-factor analysis to the 
apportionment of income of corporations (property, payroll, and sales, with sales double 
weighted) and a single factor gross receipts analysis to multi-state structures taxed as 
partnerships.  This obvious planning opportunity pre-existed the LLC and LLP. 
 124. “Certain states are out-and-out aggressive.  But in most, you can drive a Mack truck 
through the revenue department and no one will notice.  They’re often clueless about how to 
question our tax planning strategies and techniques.”  Ian Springsteel, State Tax Audit 1998, CFO 
MAGAZINE, June 1, 1998 (quoting an unnamed oil company senior tax planner), available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/2990445/c_ 3046554?f= magazine_coverstory (last visited Nov. 
12, 2006). 
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generated without any demonstrable and compensating social benefit[s].”125  
To the extent that it took place, the reallocation of the tax burden was a 
substantial and non-consensual transfer of value which occurred without 
meaningful debate.126 
LLCs and LLPs, each created during the 1990s and generally expected to 
provide pass-through tax classification and limited liability for owners of small 
businesses, have become an unintended means of narrowing the tax base in 
many states.127  LLCs have reduced state tax revenues in part because states 
did not modernize their tax legislation to accommodate the new form of 
business entity.  The states presumed that individuals subject to the personal 
income tax would own LLCs, so that the income would be pass-through and 
taxed at the individual level.  Anecdotal evidence supports the conclusion that 
these situations are far and away the most common applications of the LLC.  In 
fairness to the debate, it must be recognized that many common applications of 
the LLC have not had a negative consequence upon the state fisc.  For 
example, for reasons of taxation as well as professional tradition, law and 
accounting firms have traditionally been organized as general partnerships.128  
Subsequent to the enactment of LLC (and LLP) legislation, these professional 
practices have reorganized into a new form affording limited liability.  The tax 
consequence of the reorganization was zero—the business was taxed 
exclusively at the owner level both before and after.129 
Another common business is the small manufacturing concern owned by 
two generations of a family.  Traditionally, the operating company was 
organized as a corporation, and typically an S-corporation election was in 
place.  If the family owned the realty on which the company operated, it was 
typically owned by the family in a separate partnership and leased to the 
 
 125. Allan Walker Vestal, “. . . Drawing Near the Fastness?”—The Failed United States 
Experiment in Unincorporated Business Entity Reform, 26 J. CORP. L. 1019, 1019–20 (2001).  
This is not to say that arguments cannot be made that LLCs generate social benefits.  See 
Callison, supra note 4, at 966–67 (discussing social benefits of the LLC form advanced by 
Professor Jonathan Macey).  It is only to say, as Professor Macey observed, that such arguments 
were not before the legislatures as they enacted the LLC statutes.  Id. 
 126. Vestal, supra note 125, at 1028.  Under this classically liberal formulation, private 
wealth accumulation through a business not subject to an entity level tax results in a value 
transfer to the owners equal to the differential in the overall tax liability between a single and a 
double tax system.  See id.  Conversely, it may be argued that a double-level system results in an 
excess extraction of value.  This debate will not be either held or resolved here. 
 127. William F. Fox, The Ongoing Evolution of State Revenue Systems, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 19, 
31 (2004). 
 128. See Thomas E. Rutledge, The Place (If Any) of the Professional Structure in Entity 
Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW. 1413, 1413–16 (2003). 
 129. This statement is true at the federal level and is accurate at the state level conditioned on 
the firm doing business in a state or states where there is no entity level tax on the LLC or LLP 
into which the general partnership is reorganized. 
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corporation on a triple-net basis.  Through judicious adjustments to the lease 
rates, the earnings of the corporation would be held down while providing an 
income stream to the family.  Even if the corporation had not made an S-
corporation election, its taxable earnings would be further reduced through 
deductible bonuses to the shareholder employees.  While, conceptually, the 
earnings of the corporation, absent an S-corporation election, would be subject 
to two levels of taxation, the reality is that such businesses would have few if 
any taxable earnings.  The tax distinction between this structure and a pair of 
LLCs is not appreciable. 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the LLC, in both its multi- 
and single-member forms, as utilized by large corporations, has become an 
effective means of state tax planning.130  Income earned by an LLC owned by a 
single out-of-state member may be taxable under a state’s corporate income 
tax, but there are legitimate questions regarding whether a company with no 
presence other than owning another company that has nexus can be subject to a 
state’s corporate income tax.  In other instances the “loophole” was created by 
the state’s decision to apply its tax code in an illogical manner.  For example, 
Kentucky did not impose the corporate license tax on LLCs, even those that 
were for federal and state income tax purposes classified as corporations, and 
allowed those classified as partnerships to apportion income using a single 
factor sales formula.131 
It may be that some of the academic proponents of the reforms of the 
1990s believed that the taxation of business entities is “irrational,”132 but the 
argument was not made in Frankfort, and we have found no evidence that it 
was made in the other state capitals.  Indeed, one can only imagine that had the 
 
 130. Examples of methods employed appear at Figures 2 and 2A of SECURING KENTUCKY’S 
FUTURE, supra note 123.  Tax planning with LLCs has not been restricted to large corporations or 
to Kentucky.  See, e.g., Colin McDonald, Winnebago Windfall, MISSOULIAN, Oct. 16, 2004, at 
A1 (describing use of LLCs to own recreational vehicles purchased out of state to avoid sales 
tax). 
 131. According to a former Kentucky Revenue Cabinet official who has asked to remain 
nameless, the tax authorities never made an initial decision to exempt the LLC from the license 
tax.  Interview with Anonymous Kentucky Revenue Cabinet official (May 2006).  Rather, as the 
LLC Act was being considered, they assumed, without investigation, that LLCs would pay the 
tax.  Id.  Only after passage of the LLC Act did they realize the LLC did not fall within the 
license tax statute.  Id.; see also Fox, supra note 127, at 31–32; Rutledge & Vestal, supra note 6 
at 27 n.35. 
 132. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State 
Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 
(1995) (“Some reformers . . . are motivated by a perception that a corporate level income tax is 
irrational.”); Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire 
Approach, 55 S.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“The classical double taxation system applicable to 
corporations has been flawed for decades.  It has introduced serious allocative distortions into the 
economy.  Its effect on the distributive justice of the tax burden is most charitably described as 
uncertain, but might also be described as arbitrary and capricious.”). 
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argument been framed in those terms, and not simply in terms of the move 
being good for business, the measures would hardly have enjoyed the lopsided 
margins by which they were passed. 
VII.  TOWARD A REVENUE-DRIVEN RE-EXAMINATION 
It is a fair assessment that the states adopted the LLC form without 
extensive debate about the policy choices in these acts, and certainly without 
careful consideration of the revenue implications of the reform.  It would be a 
myth to assert that the business law reforms of the 1990s were the product of 
deliberation in the various states. 
In general, the LLC legislative process was anything but deliberative,133 
and in many state legislatures the question was reduced to: “is it good for 
business?”  Well, if by “good for business” (a prospective supposition) one 
means “is an option adopted by business” (a retrospective observation), then of 
course the elimination of entity-level taxation while maintaining limited 
liability is good for business.  Let’s see, on one hand I may pay more taxes; on 
the other hand I may pay fewer taxes.134 
If one uses the “if we build it, they will come” test, then the LLC has been 
a smashing success; extraordinarily good for business.  The history in 
Kentucky is illustrative.  In 1994, the year the LLC option became available, 
the Secretary of State received articles of organization for 415 LLCs while 
8,406 new corporations were formed.135  The lines crossed in 2001, with LLC 
filings exceeding corporations.136  In 2004 there were 14,839 LLCs formed 
against only 6,685 corporations.137 
 
 133. This is not to suggest that there was a lack of diligence and effort in the various drafting 
committees, often made up of dedicated attorneys who devoted unbillable time to crafting the 
state acts as submitted to the state legislatures.  But their task was to draft a product that answered 
the question “If our state is to have an LLC act, how should it read?”  Their task was not to 
determine “What are the broad social implications of the LLC to this state?”  See also Mark I. 
Weinstein, Limited Liability in California 1928–31: It’s The Lawyers, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
439 (2005) (discussing the adoption in 1931 of limited liability for corporations organized or 
doing business in California and the role in that adoption of members of certain elite California 
law firms). 
 134. As observed by Arthur Godfrey, “I am proud to be paying taxes in the United States.  
The only thing is—I could be just as proud for half the money.”  IRS.gov, Tax Quotes, 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110483,00.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 135. Kentucky Secretary of State, Business Services, Annual Business Filings Statistics, 
http://sos.ky.gov/business/filings/statschart.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); see also Jordan, 
supra note 112. 
 136. In that year, 7,386 LLCs were formed against 7,260 corporations.  Kentucky Secretary of 
State, supra note 135. 
 137. Id.  In 2005, the year in which “Tax Modernization” went into effect, 6,943 domestic 
corporations were formed against 14,028 LLCs.  Id. 
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But, of course, the fact that the creation of LLCs is good for business in the 
sense that the new form is popular is beside the point.  Indeed, the very 
popularity of the LLC form may indicate that, in creating the form, the 
legislature “fail[ed] to strike an appropriate balance between private gain and 
social benefit.”138  Others have suggested that, at minimum, the case for the 
economic efficiency of the extension of limited liability requires much more 
information than was available when the legislative decisions were made.139 
If, as Bill Callison has suggested, success came too easily to the 
proponents of the LLC,140 one might wonder whether there is a weakness in 
the new structure that might cause it to be re-examined and possibly changed.  
It is not an easy possibility to advance that the tidal wave of LLC adoptions 
might be undone.  But the failure to meaningfully discuss the policy 
implications of the limited liability extension, the fiscal implications of flow-
through taxation treatment, and the creation of dissonance between popular 
conceptions and the law141 may make the façade weaker than it at first appears. 
If there is a key to the weakness of the LLC façade, it is the failure to 
address the fiscal implications of the newly available business forms.  The 
record fails to demonstrate a conscious examination of the consequences of 
making the LLC available in choice of entity decisions and the impact of 
altered decisions upon the fisc.  Today a retrospective assessment of those 
impacts is, if anything, even more difficult to undertake.  Assumptions must be 
made as to which LLCs would have been organized at all, rather than 
remaining sole proprietorships or divisions, as general or limited partnerships, 
and or as corporations.  From the latter group, we need to assess (guess) as to 
which would have elected S-corporation status, an undertaking made all the 
more difficult by the continued relaxation of the S-corporation rules over the 
last decade.  One must predict, in the absence of the LLC option, what business 
activities would have left the jurisdiction to find more favorable treatment.  
And to be fair, one must compare the extended treatment of economic activity 
in the LLC form and the corporate form by taking the comparison beyond the 
firm to the members or shareholders, and accounting for different tax rates. 
 
 138. Vestal, supra note 125, at 1029. 
 139. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the 
Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 629 (1997). 
 140. Callison, supra note 4, at 953–54. 
 141. While this dissonance may be an issue with respect to the extension of limited liability to 
the partnership and the limited partnership through the LLP and LLLP, the authors acknowledge 
that this is less the case with the LLC, as it lacked an organizational precedent, and its very name 
placed third parties on notice of its most relevant organizational aspect. 
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One can imagine policy makers in good economic times forgoing such a 
horribly complex prediction142 as to the fiscal impact of the LLC form.  
Economic times were good when the LLC statute was enacted nationwide in 
the early 1990s, and one can imagine the policy makers convincing themselves 
that an ever-expanding economic pie would mask any cost of the LLC form.  
After all, it was good for business. 
The error began to unravel with the economic downturn starting in 2001.  
The effect of the economic situation on state budgets is significant and 
continuing.  Like many other states, Kentucky faced a severe shortfall in 
revenue.  The budget shortfall ran to over $144 million in FY 2003 on an 
original revenue projection of just under $7 billion, or about 2%.143  For FY 
2004 the revenue shortfall was projected to be $365 million on an original 
revenue projection of $7 billion, or about 5%.144  The fiscal 2005 deficit was 
predicted to be $710 million.145 
The Commonwealth was not alone in this situation.146  One estimate was 
that the aggregate of state revenue shortfalls would be $29 billion in fiscal 
2003 and $82 billion in fiscal 2004.147 
Many factors contributed to the shortfalls, and the economic situation in 
Kentucky was only a part of the broader, discouraging economic picture.  
Some of the factors can be ascribed to the business cycle, to the macro-
economics of a post 9/11 world, or to the policies of the Bush administration, 
depending upon one’s political orientation.  But one of the factors which 
 
 142. “I never make predictions, especially about the future.”  DAVID BRIN, THE 
TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 263 (1998) (quoting Yogi Berra).  “There are two classes of people who 
tell what is going to happen in the future: Those who don’t know, and those who don’t know they 
don’t know.”  Steve Coll, The Long Shadow of Black Monday, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1988, at H9 
(quoting John Kenneth Galbraith). 
 143. ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNOR PAUL E. PATTON, AN ASSESSMENT OF KENTUCKY’S 
FISCAL CONDITION 5B, Table 1 (2002). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Governor Ernie Fletcher, 2004 Budget Address to Kentucky Legislature (Jan. 27, 2004), 
available at http://governor.ky.gov/multimedia/speeches/budgetad2004.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 
2006). 
 146. Speaking as of April 14, 2005: 
As lawmakers craft their budgets for next fiscal year [July 1- June 30], just over half the 
states report facing another round of shortfalls.  Twenty-six states report fiscal FY 2006 
gaps.  In 17, the gaps are above 5 percent of general fund spending.  The cumulative gap 
reached nearly $27 billion, but has declined from that level as lawmakers have taken 
actions to close the shortfalls. 
Press Release, National Conference of State Legislatures, States Still Struggling to Keep Budgets 
Balanced (Apr. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2005/pr050412.htm. 
 147. This is the figure developed by the National Association of State Budget Officers, with 
information from the National Governors’ Association.  Website of the National Association of 
State Budget Officers, The Perfect Storm, http://www.nasbo.org/extras/extrasPerfect.php (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
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contributed to the state revenue shortfall is structural: the exclusion from 
taxation of business activities undertaken in LLC form that would previously 
have been taxed at the effectively higher tax system applied to corporations.148 
What is the extent of the shortfall caused by the LLC form?  The same 
analytical complexity which prodded policy makers to assume away the cost 
and skip the calculation in good times may be expected to prod policy makers 
in difficult times to use easy (and inaccurate) proxies.149 
In Kentucky, corporate tax collections, comprising the corporate income 
and the corporate license taxes, can be easily tracked over time, and prior to 
the 2005 Tax Modernization Plan, were trending down.  From the 1990 level 
of $380.6 million,150 amounting to 9.33% of total tax revenues, corporate tax 
collections dropped to $332.3 million in 2002151 for 4.45% of total tax 
revenues.  Such a drop appears interesting but not compelling until one realizes 
that the decline in revenue occurred even as the tax rate was increasing.152  
Governor Patton observed that if corporate tax receipts had remained at 10% of 
the state budget, the state would have had additional revenues of $359 
million.153 
Could it be argued that the unexamined cost of the LLC form to Kentucky 
was $359 million simply on the basis of the diminution of corporate tax 
receipts as a percentage of the general fund?  Of course not; such an argument 
 
 148. This is a subset of all activities undertaken through the LLC.  See supra notes 122–23 
and accompanying text. 
 149. One significant problem is that the state government in Kentucky simply had no reliable 
estimates for the loss in business tax revenues from the passage of the LLC statutes, and no 
reliable figures for tax receipts from businesses.  See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 112, at A1 (“State 
officials don’t know how much business-tax revenue they have lost since the Kentucky Limited 
Liability Companies Act was passed in 1994.  They think it’s a lot.”); Multiple Taxes: Governor 
Outlines Tax Modernization Plan, STATE TAX REV., Feb. 15, 2005, at 5 (“With respect to 
corporate taxes, the Governor said that ‘loopholes’ allowing large out-of-state companies to use 
the limited liability company (LLC) structure to avoid paying tax were neither fair nor 
responsible.”).  Furthermore, such estimates fail to address systemic inelastic failures of a sales 
tax system premised upon a manufacturing economy when applied to a service economy. 
 150. See Commonwealth of Kentucky Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 1998, at 175 (providing historical figures for 1989 through 1998). 
 151. See Commonwealth of Kentucky Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 2004, at 174–75 (providing historical figures for 1995 through 2004). 
 152. In 1990 the maximum corporate tax rate in Kentucky was 7.25% on all income over 
$250,000.  That year the rate was increased to 8.25% on all income over $250,000. KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 141.040; see Jordan, supra note 112. 
 153. An Assessment of Kentucky’s Fiscal Condition, supra note 143, at ii; Securing 
Kentucky’s Future, supra note 123, at 11.  It is worth observing that (former) Governor Patton’s 
statement assumes that the business community should expand at least at the same rate as does 
the requirement of the state budget.  It should be noted that by 2004 corporate tax revenues had 
rebounded to $452.7 million, comprising 5.71% of total tax revenues.  See Commonwealth of 
Kentucky Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2004, at 
174–75 (providing historical figures for 1995 through 2004). 
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would be impossible to sustain.  But it must be observed that in budgetary 
matters, when policy makers are pushed to find ways to come to balance, 
equivalence of numbers all too often substitutes for soundness of analysis.  
And as a matter of coincidence, the $359 million “LLC shortfall” was almost 
equal to the $365 million projected FY 2004 budgetary shortfall. 
As the attention of legislatures looking for revenue sources falls on the 
LLC, the divergence between popular conceptions and the law created by the 
reforms of the 1990s might make a challenge to the continued treatment of the 
LLC as a pass-through even stronger.  In Kentucky, this was made strikingly 
clear when the Governor addressed the need for tax reform to meet the 
budgetary shortfall.  In suggesting that businesses should be expected to pay an 
increased part of the tax burden, Governor Patton declared that we need a new 
business tax model which differentiates between “real partnerships” and 
LLCs.154 
Now, the situation in Kentucky was unique because of the manner of 
application of its bifurcated corporate tax, but its bifurcation illustrates how at 
least one state made a perhaps illogical decision that unquestionably cost the 
state tax revenues it would have otherwise received.  In addition to a graduated 
income tax, Kentucky imposed a “license tax” on all corporations.155  The tax 
has been interpreted as a tax on the privilege of doing business in the corporate 
form.156  On the basis that an LLC’s “formation”157 is distinct from a 
corporation’s “incorporation,” the Kentucky revenue authorities determined 
that the license tax would not apply to LLCs, even those classified for income 
tax purposes as corporations.158  The “planning opportunity” identified by the 
tax attorneys and accountants was obvious—reorganize existing corporations 
as LLCs.  The LLC would continue to be classified as a corporation, so its 
income tax liability would remain constant.159  But the business was then 
exempt from the license tax.  If we are to place credence in John Maynard 
Keynes,160 we cannot fault those professional counselors who so advised their 
clients, nor the clients who took advantage of this opportunity.161  At the same 
 
 154. Jordan, supra note 112; see also Vestal, supra note 4, at 888. 
 155. The license tax has been repealed effective January 1, 2006.  Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, Department of Revenue: Corporation Income Tax, 
http://revenue.ky.gov/business/corptax.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 156. Bosworth, Auditor v. Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co., 199 S.W. 1059, 1062 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1918). 
 157. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.020 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005). 
 158. Actually, “determined” may go too far in suggesting deliberation. 
 159. The conversion transactions were structured to satisfy § 368(a)(1)(F). 
 160. “The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit that carries any reward.”  The 
Quotations Page; Quotation Details, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/1346.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2006). 
 161. “A taxpayer need not arrange its affairs so as to maximize taxes as long as the 
transaction has a legitimate business purpose.”  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Comm’r of Internal 
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time, we must at least question how a state that in 1993 raised 26.1% of its 
total corporate tax revenue from the license tax could so cavalierly exempt 
such a range of businesses from its reach.162 
How might entities which are not “real partnerships” be asked to assume 
an increased part of the tax burden?  Governor Patton suggested that LLCs 
become subject to the Commonwealth’s corporate license tax,163 or that the 
entire business tax structure be overhauled to include a “business activities 
tax.”164  It would have been a relatively simple step, in such a climate, to 
recover the tax “loss” from the rise of the LLC to apply the license tax to all 
LLCs that were for purposes of federal income taxation classified as 
corporations.  A similar rule could have applied as well to SMLLCs in which 
the sole member is a corporation. 
Instead, casting a far wider and more finely woven net, in 2005 Kentucky 
adopted “tax modernization” and, inter alia, subjected almost all limited 
liability entities to an entity level tax with a limited non-refundable credit to 
LLC members, partnership partners, and S-corporation shareholders, and 
eliminated the corporate license tax.165 
 
Rev., 961 F.2d 1255, 1259 (6th Cir. 1992).  “[T]here is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s 
affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich and poor; and all do right, for 
nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands.”  Comm’r of Internal Rev. v. 
Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2nd Cir. 1947). 
 162. In fiscal 1993, corporate tax receipts were $168,061,752, of which $124,255,652 was the 
corporate income tax and $43,806,100 was the corporate license tax.  See Kentucky Quarterly 
Economic and Revenue Report, Annual Edition Fiscal Year 1993:4 at 25. 
 163. It was estimated that the expansion of the corporate license tax to LLCs would generate 
only $2.5 million over the two-year budget cycle.  It was also predicted by the legislative leaders 
of both parties that the expansion would probably pass.  Tom Loftus & Al Cross, 2000 General 
Assembly; Patton’s Scaled-Back Tax Plan Also in Doubt, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., February 26, 
2000, at A8.  The provision to expand the corporate license tax to LLCs was subsequently 
included in a tax reform bill.  Tom Loftus, 2002 Kentucky General Assembly; House Committee 
OKs Tax-Relief Bill, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., March 21, 2002, at F1.  Subsequently, the 
Legislative Research Commission predicted that the expansion of the corporate license tax to 
LLCs would generate $4 million to $5 million a year; other estimates place the figure closer to 
$15 million annually.  Marcus Green, Choosing a Path to Great Form; More Entrepreneurs 
Favor Limited Liability Companies, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., October 28, 2002, at F1.  In fact, 
the tax reform proposal of Governor Patton, presented in the last year of a term tainted by 
personal scandal of the horizontal nature, was not enacted. 
 164. The proposal would eliminate the corporate income tax and replace it with a business 
activity tax based on sales and payroll and would expand the corporate license tax to LLCs.  The 
estimated increase in revenues was $339.6 million.  Al Cross, Patton’s Budget Proposal; 
Legislators: Plan’s Complexity is Part of the Problem, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., February 6, 
2003, at A7. 
 165. See generally Rutledge & Vestal, supra note 6, at 26–29.  The license tax is repealed for 
companies whose fiscal years end on or after December 31, 2005.  Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
Department of Revenue: Corporation Income Tax, http://revenue.ky.gov/business/corptax.htm 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
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With economic travail a recurring experience among the states, and many 
states searching for new revenue sources, what is the worst that could happen 
in the business entity law arena from the standpoint of the 1990s reformers?  
Kentucky has changed the pass-through tax status of its domestic LLCs as well 
as those doing business within its borders.166  The same fate has befallen 
domestic and foreign LLPs.167  Such a move would invite retaliation in the 
form of actions by other state legislatures to deny pass-through taxation to the 
business operations of foreign LLCs that are the creations of non-reciprocal 
states.168  The entire form could unravel.  The same could be done with LLPs. 
Could any rational legislature embark upon such a sweeping change 
without carefully considering the consequences, and having engaged in such a 
careful analysis, could any rational legislature conclude that the reforms of the 
1990s should be unilaterally undone?  The irony here is palpable.169  The herd 
having been stampeded once based on the “good for business” rationale,170 it 
 
 166. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(24) (2003), as amended by H.B. 272, § 3, including 
within the definition of “corporation” a foreign LLC as defined in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
275.015(6) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005). 
 167. See § 141.010(24) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005), as amended by H.B. 272, § 3, 
including within the definition of “corporation” a domestic or foreign limited liability partnership.  
Domestic and foreign limited partnerships are also classified as corporations.  § 141-010(24)(f)–
(g). 
 168. Of course, efforts by any state to differentiate the taxation of domestic and foreign 
businesses will be subject to challenge under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., 
Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 
(1977). 
 169. Adding insult to irony, such an assault on the traditionally accepted pass-through 
treatment of LLCs may be made, as it has been in Kentucky, as the economy and the various state 
revenues are seeing a resurgence of strength.  See, e.g., National Governors Association/National 
Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of the States (June 2006), at vii (“Fiscal 
2006—much like fiscal 2005—has been a year of stable financial conditions for the states.”); 
National Governors Association/National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal 
Survey of the States (June 2005), at ix (“The state revenue picture for most states improved 
dramatically in fiscal 2005, a situation that is expected to continue in fiscal 2006.”); National 
Governors Association/National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of the 
States (December 2004), at 1 (“Amid a slowly recovering economy, many states realized slight 
revenue gains in fiscal 2004.  As a result, many states have been able to increase spending and 
fewer have been forced to cut their already enacted budgets, and the cuts that did occur were 
smaller than in previous years.”); Jack Brammer, $136.5 Million Surplus Boosts ‘Rainy Day’ 
Fund—State Workers’ Retirement, Teachers’ Insurance Funds Also Will Benefit, LEXINGTON 
HERALD-LEADER, July 11, 2006, at A1 (“General Fund tax receipts for fiscal year 2006, which 
ended June 30, rose by nearly 10 percent for the second year in a row.”); States of Plenty, WALL 
ST. J., June 26, 2006, at A14 (“Thanks to the snappy growth of the U.S. economy over the last 
three years, state treasuries are now overflowing with tax collections.”). 
 170. Here, we are referring to Kentucky’s response to the realization that “Tax 
Modernization” was not good for business and had numerous inequitable consequences.  See, 
e.g., Rutledge & Vestal, supra note 6, at 28–29.  In 2006, a special legislative session modified 
the new tax laws to reduce some of the negative consequences to small business.  Effective for 
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could certainly be stampeded again based on the need to balance already 
decimated budgets.171 
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Rather than again adopt a business-organization statute without regard to 
its policy and revenue implications, we ought to take the time to carefully 
discuss the form in all its aspects, a task clearly not undertaken with the LLC.  
We ought to clearly define the policy implications of an expansion of limited 
liability, and we ought to have a realistic estimate of the revenue effect, if any, 
of creating a new form that is taxed on a flow-through basis. 
Thus presented, legislatures may make informed decisions on creating new 
business forms and the continued maintenance of the forms already in 
existence and use.  One of us believes the states should adopt a system under 
which limited liability and entity taxation are linked.  What is the rationale for 
such a system?  Limited liability is a private good.  It is not a characteristic of a 
business firm that can be reproduced by bilateral contracts (unless one engages 
in the mischievous assumption that the firm could contract with all potential 
tort claimants); it is an attribute which comes from the grace of the citizens 
organized as the state.172  As a private good, it should be exchanged for a 
public benefit;173 not an ephemeral benefit like the promise that the concession 
is “good for business,” but rather a direct public benefit in the form of taxation 
of the firm’s profits. 
The other of us disagrees that the grant of limited liability should be linked 
to entity level taxation of enterprise profits, noting that the benefits of limited 
liability are enjoyed not only by the enterprise and its owners, but also by 
society as a whole in the forms of reduced transactional costs, opportunities for 
diversification of investment without supervisory costs, and increased tax 
 
tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2007, the new law returns to conformity with federal 
reporting rules for partnerships, LLCs, and S-corporations, replaces the AMC with a Limited 
Liability Entity Tax (LLET) with a credit to the owners for LLET against Kentucky personal 
income tax liability, and an exemption from the LLET for businesses with less than $3 million of 
annual receipts or gross profits with a phase-in of the LLET if annual receipts or gross revenue 
are between $3 and $6 million.  See KY. REV. STAT. §§ 141.010, 141.0205, 141.0401, 141.042, 
141.120, 141.200, 141.206, 141.208, amended by 2006 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. 1107–27 
(West). 
 171. In another context, looking at the extension of limited liability through the LLC form, J. 
William Callison suggested that “[c]ontinued critical analysis of limited liability can lead to 
further change . . . state legislatures might require risk mitigation by . . . charging franchise or 
other taxes.”  Callison, supra note 4, at 980. 
 172. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 10. 
 173. “Taxes, after all, are the dues that we pay for the privileges of membership in an 
organized society.”  KEVIN GOLDSTEIN-JACKSON, THE DICTIONARY OF ESSENTIAL 
QUOTATIONS, 152 (1983) (quoting Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
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revenues collected at the level of the enterprise owners in individual taxes.174  
Still, he would not and does not support illogical tax treatments such as the 
exception from the Kentucky license tax of LLCs classified as corporations for 
purposes of income taxation. 
Efforts have been made to characterize the restructuring efforts of business 
in responding to the changing business and tax environment as abusive 
exploitation of “loopholes.”175  Conversely, the planning opportunities existed 
only because of conscious (although perhaps not entirely well analyzed) 
decisions of revenue authorities and state legislatures; whether their utilization 
is/was abusive is debatable.  By analogy, if the state imposed a 6% sales tax on 
all new cars except those that are silver, the state could not credibly object if 
the roads were full of silver cars and little if any revenue was received from the 
sales tax on new cars.  For many years the LLC has been the silver car.  Its 
owners may awaken to an excise tax on all cars.  This is essentially the fate 
that has befallen the LLC in numerous states.176  What will happen elsewhere 
remains to be seen. 
 
 174. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 117; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
117; see also Rutledge & Vestal, supra note 6, at 33–34. 
 175. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 112; STATE TAX REV., supra note 149. 
 176. See Rutledge & Vestal, supra note 6, at 26–29. 
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